Yet another Iraq "I hate to say I told you so, but... I told you so," situation

[Dutch]

Originally Posted by Klinglerware

I disagree with you in your insinuation that Iraqis have no pride for their country. That is part of the reason why many of them are so opposed to the occupation, while most certainly appreciate the removal of Saddam, many still consider the invasion as an affront to Iraqi sovereignty.

I am saying that a vast majority of the populace has not enjoyed nationalist pride (Kurds and Shia's, I doubt were ever proud to be part of the Baathist Regime in anyway). Certainly they have pride in their homeland.

Also, I think that the government-religion connection is way overstated. I would venture to guess that the majority of middle eastern leaders pay mere lip-service to their faith in Islam. Actually, most (especially the secularists like Saddam) are deathly afraid of the influence of fundamentalist Islam on their populace--thus their impulse is to repress it or "pay the religious people off", and that makes their problems worse.

I agree.

Finally, perhaps we should be careful what we wish for when it comes to democracy. Again, it is not clear what the will of the people will end up being after we leave. If the Shiite Islamist religious movement continues to play the leading role in shaping Iraqi opinion, the resulting governments may not be so aligned with American political interest. Iran has many features of a democracy, there is universal suffrage and voters do have input in the makeup of their governments, yet personal freedoms are not guaranteed--and the reality is that this is the result of popular will whether we chose to admit this or not...

In my mind, the purpose of reform (exporting democracy) in the middle east is not to install puppet US governments. It's to install governments that are operated mostly by the will of the people. It's hard to find a democratic country with free press getting away with successful propaganda. I personally don't care if Iraq votes in a government that worships used car salesman, so long as they respect international law and police their own. That's all anyone can ask of other cultures.

The perception of Middle Eastern Reform has been very negative, but over time, I believe we will see major dividends paid as far as peace and security are concerned.

[-Mojo Jojo-]

Originally Posted by Klinglerware

I disagree with you in your insinuation that Iraqis have no pride for their country. That is part of the reason why many of them are so opposed to the occupation, while most certainly appreciate the removal of Saddam, many still consider the invasion as an affront to Iraqi sovereignty.

I question how much true Iraqi nationalism there is. The (mostly Sunni) insurgents are more than happy to attack Shiites, likely with the intention of starting a civil war. The Kurds want nothing more than to split off a make their own country. The Shiites are the only ones who appear interested in a unified Iraq, probably because they know they have a majority in the population and will rule it.

Also, I think that the government-religion connection is way overstated. I would venture to guess that the majority of middle eastern leaders pay mere lip-service to their faith in Islam. Actually, most (especially the secularists like Saddam) are deathly afraid of the influence of fundamentalist Islam on their populace--thus their impulse is to repress it or "pay the religious people off", and that makes their problems worse.

There can be little doubt but that this is true. I was recently reading (don't recall where, NY Times?) about Syria allowing Islamic fighters to cross their borders into Iraq. The story claimed (I don't know how accurate this is) that the government allowed this, not because they wanted to destabilize Iraq, but because they saw it as a good way for militants in their country to "blow off steam" and probably get killed in the process.

Finally, perhaps we should be careful what we wish for when it comes to democracy. Again, it is not clear what the will of the people will end up being after we leave. If the Shiite Islamist religious movement continues to play the leading role in shaping Iraqi opinion, the resulting governments may not be so aligned with American political interest.

I really don't think this should be the basis on which we evaluate our promotion of democracy. This was pretty much the Cold War policy -- we'd allow democracy where it favored us and overthrow it where it didn't. I don't feel like that worked out terribly well. Democratic nations may be opposed to us, but they're likely to be far less militant and aggressive, and I think over time would trend towards more similar values to us. The EU would be an invaluable ally if Iraq or Iran were to have functioning democracies. I think they, like Turkey, would be quite keen on associating with the EU, even though they were still pissed at the US.

However, as I think I've stated previously, I'm concerned about the new democracy in Iraq due to the fact that I don't see how it can succeed given the ethnic/religious tension in the country. Majoritarian rule is problematic where the majority in the nation has a real desire to oppress the minorities (and where the minorities would rather strap bombs to themselves than submit to rule by the majority). Democracy works best where the population is at least somewhat homogenous. So I'm less worried about what a democratic Iraq would do, than with what happens if Iraq's democratic government collapses into chaos.

[BishopMVP]

Originally Posted by -Mojo Jojo-

I question how much true Iraqi nationalism there is. The (mostly Sunni) insurgents are more than happy to attack Shiites, likely with the intention of starting a civil war.

The ones trying to blow up She'ates and start a civil war are pretty much all foreign terrorists. The Sunni groups want to be a part of a new government and know they would lose a civil war. http://www.time.com/time/magazine/pr...029862,00.html and http://www.signonsandiego.com/news/w...1050-iraq.html provide recent indications along these lines.

The Kurds want nothing more than to split off a make their own country.

We are pretty much the only friend the Kurds have ever had. They're willing to acquiesce to near-autonomy in order to avoid pissing us off.

The Shiites are the only ones who appear interested in a unified Iraq, probably because they know they have a majority in the population and will rule it.

"The Shi'ites" are not that unified a political force - it worked well to win the initial vote, but the more actual decisions get made, the more fractured the bloc will become.

I was recently reading (don't recall where, NY Times?) about Syria allowing Islamic fighters to cross their borders into Iraq. The story claimed (I don't know how accurate this is) that the government allowed this, not because they wanted to destabilize Iraq, but because they saw it as a good way for militants in their country to "blow off steam" and probably get killed in the process.

That's not all the Syrians are doing - http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory?id=525013 They think that when Iraq begins to stabilize, they will be next, so they (along with the Iranians) are doing their best to prevent that from happening. In the long run, I think they'll fail, but I hope they're right in their assumption.

[Leonidas]

All this debate about why we invaded Iraq, oil, WMD, democracy. Hey, all that's window dressing. I never understood why the Bushies pushed this war the way they did because I think they could have better justified it to the nation and the world if they levelled from the get go. I served in the invasion, I have been to Iraq, I am currently supporting planes flying into Iraq every day and I fully supported this war for what it's real purpose was, regardless of what end-arounds were made by the neo-cons to make it fly.

This war was fought to change the paradigm of the war on terror. It was meant to shift the focus of ops for al Qaida from the US to the Middle East, end of discussion, and it has worked. We flushed them out of Afghanistan, but that left a huge chunk of territory from Syria to Iran for AQ to move to, operate from, and plan more attacks on US soil. The Bushies weighed their options, and decided Iraq was the best option to break up this block of territory. I am willing to admit AQ wasn't fully operating in Iraq when the decision to invade was made, but is there any serious doubt it was just a matter of time? At the very least Iraq would have provided a ready route and willing counduit for terrorists to move from Iran westward to other locales where they could more easily gain access to the US.

And what has happened? The war on terror is now being fought against insurgents, AQ, and AQ wannabees in Iraq. The paradigm has shifted. Terrorists have been diverted from the US and are now battling US and Iraq troops in Iraq. Is that really so much worse than having more 9/11's? As a military member, I am proud to take on the brunt of this battle "over there". There is a "however" in all this though. This is a temporary fix. We can't keep the battle "over there" indefinitely. Eventually AQ will regain its focus and find a way to bring the fight back to the US. And eventually the American public will get fed up with a war with no end. Now the big question is what are the Bushies going to do long term to deal with that.

[flere-imsaho]

Originally Posted by Leonidas

This war was fought to change the paradigm of the war on terror. It was meant to shift the focus of ops for al Qaida from the US to the Middle East, end of discussion, and it has worked. We flushed them out of Afghanistan, but that left a huge chunk of territory from Syria to Iran for AQ to move to, operate from, and plan more attacks on US soil. The Bushies weighed their options, and decided Iraq was the best option to break up this block of territory. I am willing to admit AQ wasn't fully operating in Iraq when the decision to invade was made, but is there any serious doubt it was just a matter of time? At the very least Iraq would have provided a ready route and willing counduit for terrorists to move from Iran westward to other locales where they could more easily gain access to the US.

One of the few things Saddam Hussein was consistent about was supressing religious troublemakers. Records from the 90s show that Al-Qaida tried, and repeatedly failed, to make any inroads with him. Now you want me to believe he would have made Iraq a haven for Al-Qaida? What's in it for him? Let's see:

*Even greater scrutiny from the West.
*An armed group operating in his borders but outside of his jurisdiction.
*Pissing Saudi Arabia off.

Sorry, that argument doesn't fly.

Luckily for Al-Qaida, though, we've now ensured years, if not decades of disorder in Iraq, so they can set up shop with (relative) ease.

[flere-imsaho]

Originally Posted by Leonidas

And what has happened? The war on terror is now being fought against insurgents, AQ, and AQ wannabees in Iraq. The paradigm has shifted. Terrorists have been diverted from the US and are now battling US and Iraq troops in Iraq. Is that really so much worse than having more 9/11's? As a military member, I am proud to take on the brunt of this battle "over there". There is a "however" in all this though. This is a temporary fix. We can't keep the battle "over there" indefinitely. Eventually AQ will regain its focus and find a way to bring the fight back to the US. And eventually the American public will get fed up with a war with no end. Now the big question is what are the Bushies going to do long term to deal with that.

So invading Iraq bought us what, 5, 10 years of respite from Al-Qaida attacks on U.S. soil? Uh, great. Except that it's not even true - according to the government, we continue to be under threat.

I'm sure there are solutions to the terrorism problem, but invading Iraq doesn't look like it was one of them.

[Leonidas]

Originally Posted by flere-imsaho

One of the few things Saddam Hussein was consistent about was supressing religious troublemakers. Records from the 90s show that Al-Qaida tried, and repeatedly failed, to make any inroads with him. Now you want me to believe he would have made Iraq a haven for Al-Qaida? What's in it for him? Let's see:

*Even greater scrutiny from the West.
*An armed group operating in his borders but outside of his jurisdiction.
*Pissing Saudi Arabia off.

Sorry, that argument doesn't fly.

Luckily for Al-Qaida, though, we've now ensured years, if not decades of disorder in Iraq, so they can set up shop with (relative) ease.

Pissing off Saudi Arabia should have scared Saddam how? And I didn't say Saddam would have necessarily in cahoots with AQ, I said Iraq would have made a perfect conduit for terrorists to hide or pass through in a region extending from Iran through Syria. The Arabs created the proverb "The enemy of my enemy is my friend" and this would especially hold true for Saddam and AQ against the US. The US is a shared enemy that would easily transcend any emnity Saddam and AQ had. And you may or may not recall shortly before the invasion (around fall 0f 02) Saddam suddenly found religion so it's not as though he would have been unwilling to redefine himself to make him a more suitable ally to AQ. The walls between AQ and Saddam were far from insurmountable. A little cash and a shared enemy would have gone a very long way to forgetting their differences.

And yes, I think we did buy just limited time. Again, I said that up front. Maybe not even 5-10 years, but it's been over 3 years so far and counting. My last point concedes this is a very near-sighted strategy. It buys us time and allows a place where US forces can battle terrorists directly, but it's only a matter of time before AQ shifts focus back to US soil. But for now they are clearly concerned with fighting US forces on the ground in Iraq.

It's the same strategy Bin Laden used against the Soviets in the 80's and it helped to destory Soviet prestige as well as cripple morale of the Soviet military, which has never really recovered. Bin Laden himself has frequently refered to Vietnam and how US forces were demoralized by that war and made direct comparisons with the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. It took nearly 20 years for our military to recover from Vietnam. Bin Laden is fully aware of that and is trying to achieve something between a repeat of Vietnam and a repeat of Mujahadeen success against the Soviets in Afghanistan. For now AQ is content to engage US forces on that front. In time it will change and I'm interested in what our foreign policy wonks have in mind to be ready when that changes.

[Klinglerware]

Originally Posted by Leonidas

This war was fought to change the paradigm of the war on terror. It was meant to shift the focus of ops for al Qaida from the US to the Middle East, end of discussion, and it has worked. We flushed them out of Afghanistan, but that left a huge chunk of territory from Syria to Iran for AQ to move to, operate from, and plan more attacks on US soil. The Bushies weighed their options, and decided Iraq was the best option to break up this block of territory. I am willing to admit AQ wasn't fully operating in Iraq when the decision to invade was made, but is there any serious doubt it was just a matter of time? At the very least Iraq would have provided a ready route and willing counduit for terrorists to move from Iran westward to other locales where they could more easily gain access to the US.

Interesting, but a couple of points here:

1. When al-Qaeda was "flushed", there were much easier roads to hoe than schlepping to Iraq where Saddam wasn't going to give them a warm welcome. Again, Iraq would support the more nationalist/pseudo-socialist terror groups targeted against their rivals, but Saddam would be loath to support islamist groups that could potentially cause stirrings in the population. After all, the Iranians had been supporting fundamentalist terror groups against Iraq for years. Of course there are differences in ideology between AQ and Iranian backed fundamentalist groups, but why would Saddam trust either?

Also, al-Qaeda in Afghanistan didn't have to move very far: they could have moved to parts of Afghanistan not fully under control, or Pakistan. Pakistan would have been an easier conduit for AQ people to leave the Middle East altogether (bound for the African horn, East Africa, and points beyond.

Originally Posted by Leonidas

And what has happened? The war on terror is now being fought against insurgents, AQ, and AQ wannabees in Iraq. The paradigm has shifted. Terrorists have been diverted from the US and are now battling US and Iraq troops in Iraq. Is that really so much worse than having more 9/11's? As a military member, I am proud to take on the brunt of this battle "over there". There is a "however" in all this though. This is a temporary fix. We can't keep the battle "over there" indefinitely. Eventually AQ will regain its focus and find a way to bring the fight back to the US. And eventually the American public will get fed up with a war with no end.

2. How efficacious can this "low-hanging fruit strategy" really be? If AQ is really involved in Iraq, it is just a side-show for them. AQ has turned into an umbrella organization at this point, where planning and execution can occur from any number of places. Even prior to the Afghanistan campaign, much of the logistical planning for attacks in the West occured in the West. While AQ is currently in a greatly weakened state, it retains the capacity for global ops because it's logistical planning capacity is scattered globally.

If the terror war was indeed the real reasoning behind the Iraq invasion, you are right that this is only a temporary solution. But if it was the real reasoning, then why attempt to stabilize Iraq at all?

Originally Posted by Leonidas

Now the big question is what are the Bushies going to do long term to deal with that.

By their own admission, the administration is not going to be around for that eventuality. But it will be interesting to see how they'll lay the ground work.

[Dutch]

Let's not forget that Saddam Hussein didn't have to give anybody a warm welcome in the North or South "No-fly zones". They were great in theory and perfect for protecting Kurds and Shia's from Saddam, but they provided blanket protection for everybody.

There were Al Qaeda sponsored camps in the north on the Iranian border. If Saddam moved troops on them, it would have been done without air support. The Iraqi military on the ground would also have to fight through UN Air Power (okay, US/UK/Aus air power) who were on 24 hour guard to fight any Iraqi mobilization against people in these zones.

Need to get terrorists/supplies/weapons/explosives/drugs from Pakistan to Israel? No problem, Iran will let anybody pass, northern Iraq was out of control, Syria...same as Iran. It's not as easy today.

One of the things that has been overlooked in this War on Terror is the near capitulation of the Hamas in Israel. Saddam Hussein was the primary provider for them.

Just some more reasons why the sanctions had to end.

[Klinglerware]

Originally Posted by Dutch

One of the things that has been overlooked in this War on Terror is the near capitulation of the Hamas in Israel. Saddam Hussein was the primary provider for them.

Not really true that Saddam was the primary sponsor for Hamas. Actually, while he did make a big show of sending out the money to suicide bombers' families, he was barely a bit player when it came to Hamas funding. Iran is the primary state sponsor of the group, and Hamas is also heavily dependent financially on organizations fronting as Islamic charities. Hamas' near-neutralization in recent times is due to the US going hard against the front organizations and Israel's highly effective assasination campaign against the Hamas leadership.

[Dutch]

Fair enough. I will maintain that Saddam Hussein's bonus money was a root motivator for suicide bombers in Israel. Even if the only proof I have is the lack of funding which seems to coincide with the lack of bombings.

But we cannot beat our chests too much in victory, because Saddam Hussein's ability to communicate with suicide bombers pales in comparison to the Al Qaeda network. You would be amazed at just how organized they are.

[Klinglerware]

Originally Posted by Dutch

But we cannot beat our chests too much in victory, because Saddam Hussein's ability to communicate with suicide bombers pales in comparison to the Al Qaeda network. You would be amazed at just how organized they are.

Agreed. Their organizational and logistical capacity boggles the mind.

[flere-imsaho]

In the category of "Old News, Now With New Detail" today's New York Times has an article that goes into extensive detail about mistakes at the Pentagon and how they led to the variety of armor problems for troops in Iraq.

My brother, who is in the Guard and will be in Iraq in a few months, told me that his commander, who has already served over there, has taken the money the unit has been given and gone to 3rd parties to buy the armor and other equipment they'll need in Iraq and can't count on the Pentagon to provide. Thanks to this article, we now know why.

[Dutch]

What's the solution Flere?

[Glengoyne]

Originally Posted by Dutch

What's the solution Flere?

I'm not Flere. But how about this?

The Pentagon could have awarded a "no-bid" contract to Armorworks. They were a tried and true supplier of the bullet proof ceramic plates that had "tooled up" to mass produce the goods.

Oh yeah. That would have been just another scandal for the Pentagon to deal with. Better to go with the low bidder.

[Arles]

Sure makes you glad you had the world's leader in oil management and production join the Iraq team in Halliburton. I shudder to think of all the similar issues that could have come up with their low-bid, under-prepared competitors from outside the US.

[flere-imsaho]

Originally Posted by Dutch

What's the solution Flere?

Assess your military's capabilities properly before engaging in a war for which you have the luxury of determing the date of invasion.

[Glengoyne]

Originally Posted by flere-imsaho

Assess your military's capabilities properly before engaging in a war for which you have the luxury of determing the date of invasion.

I agree. I also think this Cody fellow should be ejected from the millitary for deciding or at least signing off on the idea that we didn't need armor for every soldier sent to Iraq.

[flere-imsaho]

Today's New York Times has an article about the systematic looting that was done immediately after the U.S. invasion. Apparently organized groups were able to dismantle and carry away, en masse high-tech pieces of machinery, including machines that could be used as part of a process to create nuclear weapons.

Let's assume this is true. Why wasn't this equipment secured by U.S. forces? After all, wasn't securing WMD one of the Administration's goals in Iraq? Wasn't this exactly the equipment they were afraid of falling into the hands of bad people?

Colin Powell, amongst others, said that if you were going to invade Iraq, you needed to do it with a massive force of troops, in order to establish security and avoid exactly this kind of activity. I'm so glad wiser, and more experienced heads prevailed....

Article posted below for those who don't want to register for NYTimes:

In the weeks after Baghdad fell in April 2003, looters systematically dismantled and removed tons of machinery from Saddam Hussein's most important weapons installations, including some with high-precision equipment capable of making parts for nuclear arms, a senior Iraqi official said this week in the government's first extensive comments on the looting.

The Iraqi official, Sami al-Araji, the deputy minister of industry, said it appeared that a highly organized operation had pinpointed specific plants in search of valuable equipment, some of which could be used for both military and civilian applications, and carted the machinery away.

Dr. Araji said his account was based largely on observations by government employees and officials who either worked at the sites or lived near them.

"They came in with the cranes and the lorries, and they depleted the whole sites," Dr. Araji said. "They knew what they were doing; they knew what they want. This was sophisticated looting."

The threat posed by these types of facilities was cited by the Bush administration as a reason for invading Iraq, but the installations were left largely unguarded by allied forces in the chaotic months after the invasion.

Dr. Araji's statements came just a week after a United Nations agency disclosed that approximately 90 important sites in Iraq had been looted or razed in that period.

Satellite imagery analyzed by two United Nations groups - the International Atomic Energy Agency and the Monitoring, Verification and Inspection Commission, or Unmovic - confirms that some of the sites identified by Dr. Araji appear to be totally or partly stripped, senior officials at those agencies said. Those officials said they could not comment on all of Dr. Araji's assertions, because the groups had been barred from Iraq since the invasion.

For nearly a year, the two agencies have sent regular reports to the United Nations Security Council detailing evidence of the dismantlement of Iraqi military installations and, in a few cases, the movement of Iraqi gear to other countries. In addition, a report issued last October by the chief American arms inspector in Iraq, Charles A. Duelfer, told of evidence of looting at crucial sites.

The disclosures by the Iraqi ministry, however, added new information about the thefts, detailing the timing, the material taken and the apparent skill shown by the thieves.

Dr. Araji said equipment capable of making parts for missiles as well as chemical, biological and nuclear arms was missing from 8 or 10 sites that were the heart of Iraq's dormant program on unconventional weapons. After the invasion, occupation forces found no unconventional arms, and C.I.A. inspectors concluded that the effort had been largely abandoned after the Persian Gulf war in 1991.

Dr. Araji said he had no evidence regarding where the equipment had gone. But his account raises the possibility that the specialized machinery from the arms establishment that the war was aimed at neutralizing had made its way to the black market or was in the hands of foreign governments.

"Targeted looting of this kind of equipment has to be seen as a proliferation threat," said Gary Milhollin, director of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, a private nonprofit organization in Washington that tracks the spread of unconventional weapons.

Dr. Araji said he believed that the looters themselves were more interested in making money than making weapons.

The United Nations, worried that the material could be used in clandestine bomb production, has been hunting for it, largely unsuccessfully, across the Middle East. In one case, investigators searching through scrap yards in Jordan last June found specialized vats for highly corrosive chemicals that had been tagged and monitored as part of the international effort to keep watch on the Iraqi arms program. The vessels could be used for harmless industrial processes or for making chemical weapons.

American military officials in Baghdad did not respond to repeated requests for comment on the findings. But American officials have said in the past that while they were aware of the importance of some of the installations, there was not enough military personnel to guard all of them during and after the invasion.

White House officials, apprised of the Iraqi account by The New York Times, said it was already well known that many weapons sites had been looted. They had no other comment.

Daily Looting Reports

Many of Iraq's weapons sites are clustered in an area from Baghdad's southern outskirts to roughly the town of Iskandariya, about 30 miles south. Dr. Araji, who like many others at the Industry Ministry kept going to work immediately after the invasion, was able to collect observations of the organized looting from witnesses who went to the ministry in Baghdad each day.

The Industry Ministry also sent teams of engineers to the looted sites in August and September of 2003 as part of an assessment undertaken for the Coalition Provisional Authority, the interim American-led administrative apparatus. By then, virtually all of the most refined equipment was gone, Dr. Araji said.

The peak of the organized looting, Dr. Araji estimates, occurred in four weeks from mid-April to mid-May of 2003 as teams with flatbed trucks and other heavy equipment moved systematically from site to site. That operation was followed by rounds of less discriminating thievery.

"The first wave came for the machines," Dr. Araji said. "The second wave, cables and cranes. The third wave came for the bricks."

Hajim M. al-Hasani, the minister of industry, referred questions about looting to Dr. Araji, who commented during a lengthy interview conducted in English in his office on Wednesday and a brief phone interview on Friday.

Dr. Araji said that if the equipment had left the country, its most likely destination was a neighboring state.

David Albright, an authority on nuclear weaponry who is president of the Institute for Science and International Security in Washington, said that Syria and Iran were the countries most likely to be in the market for the kind of equipment that Mr. Hussein purchased, at great cost, when he was secretly trying to build a nuclear weapon in the 1980's.

Losses at Enrichment Site

As examples of the most important sites that were looted, Dr. Araji cited the Nida Factory, the Badr General Establishment, Al Ameer, Al Radwan, Al Hatteen, Al Qadisiya and Al Qaqaa. Al Radwan, for example, was a manufacturing plant for the uranium enrichment program, with enormous machine tools for making highly specialized parts, according to the Wisconsin Project. The Nida Factory was implicated in both the nuclear program and the manufacture of Scud missiles.

Al Qaqaa, with some 1,100 structures, manufactured powerful explosives that could be used for conventional missile warheads and for setting off a nuclear detonation. Last fall, Iraqi government officials warned the United States and international nuclear inspectors that some 377 tons of those explosives were missing after the invasion. But Al Qaqaa also contained a wide variety of weapons manufacturing machinery, including 800 pieces of chemical equipment.

The kinds of machinery at the various sites included equipment that could be used to make missile parts, chemical weapons or centrifuges essential for enriching uranium for atom bombs. All of that "dual use" equipment also has peaceful applications - for example, a tool to make parts for a nuclear implosion device or for a powerful commercial jet turbine.

Mr. Hussein's rise to power in Iraq culminated in his military building not only deadly missiles but many unconventional arms. After the 1991 gulf war, international inspectors found that Baghdad was close to making an atom bomb and had succeeded in producing thousands of biological and chemical warheads.

Starting in 1991, the United Nations began destroying Iraq's unconventional arms and setting up a vast effort to monitor the country's industrial infrastructure to make sure that Baghdad lived up to its disarmament promises. The International Atomic Energy Agency, based in Vienna, was put in charge of nuclear sites, and Unmovic, based in New York, was given responsibility for chemical and biological plants as well as factories that made rockets and missiles.

A Western diplomat familiar with satellite reconnaissance done by the International Atomic Energy Agency said it confirmed some of the Iraqi findings. For instance, he said, it showed that the Nida Factory had been partly destroyed, with some buildings removed, and some rebuilt. He added that the Badr General Establishment was almost entirely dismantled.

By contrast, he said, the agency's photo analysts found Al Ameer untouched, but only as seen from overhead. "The buildings could be totally empty," he said.

The diplomat added that the atomic energy agency's reconnaissance team found that Al Radwan was "significantly dismantled" and that Al Qadisiya had almost vanished. At the sprawling Hatteen base, he said, "parts are untouched, and parts are 100 percent gone."

Before the invasion, the United Nations was monitoring those kinds of sites. Two senior officials of the monitoring commission said in an interview that their agency's analysis of satellite reconnaissance photos of Iraq showed visible looting and destruction at five of the seven sites that had been cited by Dr. Araji.

The officials cautioned that the agency zeroed in on certain buildings of special interest in its monitoring work on unconventional weapons and that other structures or warehouses at a particular identified site might still be intact.

"You might have a place with 100 buildings but we'd have an interest in only 3 of them," an official said.

Officials at the United Nations monitoring agency said some areas of the sprawling Qaqaa installation involved in chemical processing had been wrecked by fire and possible extensive looting. Unknown is the fate of such equipment there like separators, heat exchangers, mixers and chemical reactors, all of which can be used in making chemical weapons.

The Badr General Establishment, they said, had been systematically razed. "It's fairly significant," one official said of the looting and disappearance of important buildings.

The Radwan site has been dismantled, they said, with the destruction quite extensive. And the Qadisiya small arms plant has been razed, they said, as have the buildings the agency monitored at the sprawling Hatteen installation. The two officials said the agency had no information on the condition of the Nida Factory or the Ameer site.

No Saudi or Iranian Replies

The recent monitoring agency report said Unmovic had asked Iraq's neighbors if they were aware of whether any equipment under agency monitoring had moved in or through their countries. Syrian officials, it said, replied that "no relevant scrap from Iraq had passed through Syria." The agency, the report added, had yet to receive a response from Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Dr. Hasani, the Iraqi industry minister, said the sites of greatest concern had been part of the Military Industrialization Commission, a department within the ministry until it became a separate entity in the 1990's. The commission, widely known as the M.I.C., was dissolved after the fall of Baghdad, and responsibility for its roughly 40 sites was divided between the ministries of industry and finance, Dr. Hasani said. "We got 11 of them," he said.

Dr. Araji, whose tenure with the ministry goes back to the 1980's, is now involved in plans to use the sites as manufacturing centers in what the ministry hopes will be a new free-market economy in Iraq. He said that disappointment at losing such valuable equipment was a prime reason that the ministry was determined to speak frankly about what had happened.

"We talk straight about these matters, because it's a sad thing that this took place in Iraq," Dr. Araji said. "We need anything that could support us here."

"When you have good factories that could support that move and that transformation," he said, "it would be good for the economy of the country."

In an interview, a senior atomic energy agency official said the agency had used the reconnaissance photos to study roughly 100 sites in Iraq but that the imagery's high cost meant that the inspectors could afford to get updates of individual sites only about once a year.

In its most recent report to the United Nations Security Council, in October, the agency said it "continues to be concerned about the widespread and apparently systematic dismantlement that has taken place at sites previously relevant to Iraq's nuclear program."

Alarms to Security Council

Agency inspectors, in visiting other countries, have discovered tons of industrial scrap, some radioactively contaminated, from Iraq, the report noted. It added, however, that the agency had been unable to track down any of the high-quality, dual-use equipment or materials.

"The disappearance of such equipment," the report emphasized, "may be of proliferation significance."

The monitoring commission has filed regular reports to the Security Council since raising alarms last May about looting in Iraq, the dismantlement of important weapons installations and the export of dangerous materials to foreign states.

Officials of the commission and the atomic energy agency have repeatedly called on the Iraqi government to report on what it knows of the fate of the thousands of pieces of monitored equipment and stockpiles of monitored chemicals and materials.

Last fall, Dr. Mohamed ElBaradei, director general of the International Atomic Energy Agency, put public pressure on the interim Iraqi government to start the process of accounting for nuclear-related materials still ostensibly under the agency's supervision. Iraq is obliged, he wrote to the president of the Security Council on Oct. 1, to declare semiannually changes that have occurred or are foreseen.

In interviews, officials of the monitoring commission and the atomic energy agency said the two agencies had heard nothing from Baghdad - with one notable exception. On Oct. 10, the Iraqi Ministry of Science and Technology wrote to the atomic agency to say a stockpile of high explosives at Al Qaqaa had been lost because of "theft and looting."

During the American presidential election last fall, news of that letter ignited a political firestorm. Privately, officials of the monitoring commission and the atomic energy agency have speculated on whether the political uproar made Baghdad reluctant to disclose more details of looting.

[Arles]

Probably because the US simply didn't care about securing it and wanted to make sure there was no trace found that Saddam may have dealt with WMD so the administration would look silly.

Or, perhaps the military hadn't found all of them yet and was more concerned about winning the military battles with as few lives lost as possible. My guess is Saddam sympathizers in Iraq prior to the US military action probably had a bit of a leg up on the US from a logistics standpoint when it comes to the numerous hiding spots of WMD.

That certainly would have been nice information for the UN inspectors to provide the US with prior to the invasion. After all, they had been monitoring the country for a decade and you would think they would have been able to tell us that. Alas, the UN was silent on this issue prior to the invasion.

[flere-imsaho]

Give me a break, Arles. Now you're accusing the U.N. of deliberately witholding information from the U.S. so that they'd look bad after this?

Bush & Co. gave us the impression that they knew where these weapons were and that securing them was a priority:

Right now, Iraq is expanding and improving facilities that were used for the production of biological weapons.

United Nations' inspections also revealed that Iraq likely maintains stockpiles of VX, mustard and other chemical agents, and that the regime is rebuilding and expanding facilities capable of producing chemical weapons.

Source.

And surveillance photos reveal that the regime is rebuilding facilities that it had used to produce chemical and biological weapons.

Source.

There are plenty of other quotes, but I'm sure you get the idea.

Again, if the Bush Administration was so worried about WMD, why not go in with a clear plan, and a properly-staffed and equipped force to accomplish the tasks of:

• Oust Saddam
• Provide Security
• Find and secure weapons

I think there are two possible answers: 1. The Bush Admin's plan was very poor. 2. The Bush Admin didn't really care about securing these weapons all that much.

[flere-imsaho]

Originally Posted by Arles

Or, perhaps the military hadn't found all of them yet and was more concerned about winning the military battles with as few lives lost as possible.

I'm at a loss, really.

Did Bush & Co. assume machinery, raw materials, et. al. would just sit around, untouched, while the military completed securing the country (2 years and counting, btw)?

Is the loss of these materials to the black market considered acceptable?

[gstelmack]

Wait a second, I though Iraq didn't have a WMD program? So where did all this stuff come from for them to carry away? Or are you now saying we were justified in going in there, but should have gone in stronger?

[Arles]

Originally Posted by flere-imsaho

Give me a break, Arles. Now you're accusing the U.N. of deliberately witholding information from the U.S. so that they'd look bad after this?

No, I'm accussing them of being so incompetant that they had no clue where these sites were even after monitoring the country for a decade.

Did Bush & Co. assume machinery, raw materials, et. al. would just sit around, untouched, while the military completed securing the country (2 years and counting, btw)?

I think it's a fair assumption that had the US military known certain sites had WMD material, they would have secured them. But, when they don't know which sites did and did not, it becomes harder to decide which ones to devote significant manpower. Again, if an organization had been monitoring and inspecting Iraq for a decade and these inspections were "working" (as many have claimed), you would think they could have had the ability to point us to some general directions for securing this type of information. But, that was not the case as the UN was just as clueless to their locations. Certainly gives a lot of credence to that great job the inspectors were doing, doesn't it?

UN in 2003 - "We can't see any evidence of WMD in Iraq or materials that make them. So, the US should not invade".

UN in 2005 - "I can't believe the US didn't secure all these WMD material sites when they invaded in 2003."

The Bush Admin didn't really care about securing these weapons all that much.

Yeah, that's pretty likely. They knew where they were, but didn't care about finding them and proving their case.

[flere-imsaho]

Originally Posted by gstelmack

Wait a second, I though Iraq didn't have a WMD program? So where did all this stuff come from for them to carry away? Or are you now saying we were justified in going in there, but should have gone in stronger?

Iraq had a WMD program, but it had been seriously derailed by U.N. sanctions and inspections, to the point of not representing a threat. However, this is not to say that useful machinery and conventional weapons did not exist. These should have been secured.

As for "going in", my viewpoint remains the same: When we decided to go in (which was not my first choice) we should have followed the advice of seasoned professionals, such as Colin Powell, and gone in with a sufficiently large calvalry and infantry force to give our best effort at securing the country. I believe a figure of 400,000 troops was bandied about.

Of course, it's not surprising to me that this Administration didn't learn the lessons from Vietnam about pussy-footing around.

Anyway, my question remains: If this threat, the threat of WMD let loose upon the world through Saddam selling technology, intelligence and weapons to terrorists and rogue states, to say nothing of using it himself, was the threat talked up by this Administration who led us to war, why did they fail so completely to secure this machinery and these components?

[flere-imsaho]

Originally Posted by Arles

No, I'm accussing them of being so incompetant that they had no clue where these sites were even after monitoring the country for a decade.

If that's the case, then you should be willing to tar the Bush Admin with the same brush. Remember Rumsfeld's "We know where they are, they're to the North, the South, the East and the West somewhat of Baghdad." Rumsfeld & the Admin gave the impression they knew where the sites were, and that they would secure them.

Later, we learned that the sites they thought existed didn't exist. Now we learn that sites (of lesser importance, but still) did exist, and weren't secured.

What is this, then? In my book, it's incompetence.

I think it's a fair assumption that had the US military known certain sites had WMD material, they would have secured them. But, when they don't know which sites did and did not, it becomes harder to decide which ones to devote significant manpower.

So what is this, another failure of intelligence?

Again, if an organization had been monitoring and inspecting Iraq for a decade and these inspections were "working" (as many have claimed), you would think they could have had the ability to point us to some general directions for securing this type of information. But, that was not the case as the UN was just as clueless to their locations. Certainly gives a lot of credence to that great job the inspectors were doing, doesn't it?

The sanctions and inspections worked. Iraq had no WMD and had only the barest beginnings of a WMD program. I'm not going to defend those in the U.N. who felt there was still more stuff there, but let's not forget that it wasn't the U.N. who invaded on the basis of what now appears to be faulty intelligence.

The point here is that not only did the Bush Admin (using the U.S. military and U.S. Intelligence) fail to find WMD, they failed to find and secure even the most basic of supplies that Iraq had left after those years of sanctions. One would feel that after making such a big deal of the WMD and the "terrorists getting their hands on the materials" threat, the Bush Admin would leverage everything it had to find and secure anything on this basis.

Yeah, that's pretty likely. They knew where they were, but didn't care about finding them and proving their case.

Of course. So the reason, then, is pretty obvious: arrogance. Rumsfeld, Cheney et. al., took the intelligence they liked and made the case for war. Rumsfeld, Cheney, et. al., ignored the advice of seasoned military commanders and invaded with too few troops to do the job correctly. Now, thanks to Rumsfeld, Cheney, et. al., what Iraq did have in the way of weapons programs (which, admittedly, wasn't much) is now probably in the hands of terrorists. Good job, guys.

[Arles]

Originally Posted by flere-imsaho

Anyway, my question remains: If this threat, the threat of WMD let loose upon the world through Saddam selling technology, intelligence and weapons to terrorists and rogue states, to say nothing of using it himself, was the threat talked up by this Administration who led us to war, why did they fail so completely to secure this machinery and these components?

If we knew where all these items were going into the war, we simply would have had to do targeted air and ground strikes to secure/destroy them. The problem (and the reason Saddam needed to be removed) was we did not know the extent of his WMD weapons and machinery from a logistics standpoint. So, we were left with options of having Saddam continue to trick inspectors and trust that he won't ever create WMD (like he did in the past) or take a proactive action. But, nowhere in this process did we know the location and/or type of every weapon component that Saddam had.

Again, the UN could not find this information in over a decade of inspections and it is not practical to expect the US to identify every hiding place within a month of entering battle in Iraq. So, it is not surprising that some looting and movement of material occurred. But, I don't know of anyway short of carpet-bombing Iraq to have prevented that from happening. Given the UN had no valuable information on locations or these items, we were left in the undesirable position of having to root out each spot and find them on our own.

[flere-imsaho]

Originally Posted by Arles

The problem (and the reason Saddam needed to be removed) was we did not know the extent of his WMD weapons and machinery from a logistics standpoint.

Of course it turns out that we did know this - he basically had squat.

So, we were left with options of having Saddam continue to trick inspectors and trust that he won't ever create WMD (like he did in the past) or take a proactive action.

You mean "having Saddam try to continue to trick inspectors", of course. One could argue, of course, that an inspection and sanctions regime was a proactive action.

But, nowhere in this process did we know the location and/or type of every weapon component that Saddam had.

That's a meaningless comment. The Bush Admin made it really clear that they knew where at least some of them were. When it turned out that they were wrong, that's either bad intelligence or incompetence or both. Then, to make matters worse, they put themselves into a position where they don't have sufficient resources on the ground to find and secure what was there that they didn't know about.

I mean really, what did Rumsfeld, et. al. expect?

1. Invade, find everything right where they thought it would be, and nothing anywhere else, and be done.

2. Invade, not have to provide security because the country won't be discombobulated by this, and spend time looking for the stuff.

3. Invade, confident that Baath party members will show them where everything is.

Again, from the start this Administration viewed the whole operation from a best-case scenario viewpoint, and planned accordingly. As a result of their lack of due diligence, we'll continue to pay a price.

Again, the UN could not find this information in over a decade of inspections and it is not practical to expect the US to identify every hiding place within a month of entering battle in Iraq.

Doesn't that bother you, then? What if some of the material they couldn't find immediately was fissle material? Or VX gas? Face it, the Bush Admin's plan completely failed to prepare the U.S. military for the realities of the tasks it had to accomplish. For a plan that was supposed to depose a madman leader and secure his dangerous WMD, lest it fall into terrorist plans, it seems to me it was pretty ill conceived.

So, it is not surprising that some looting and movement of material occurred. But, I don't know of anyway short of carpet-bombing Iraq to have prevented that from happening.

Why do you think Colin Powell et. al., suggested a much larger initial force on the ground, then?

Given the UN had no valuable information on locations or these items, we were left in the undesirable position of having to root out each spot and find them on our own.