HBO Documentary: "Hacking Democracy"

[Warhammer]

Supposedly there are reports of voter fraud here in Shelby County for Harold Ford, Jr. Interesting to see if this is true or not. But, there was voter fraud in some precincts in an election this summer to replace his uncle in the state senate after he (John Ford) was indicted in the Tennessee Waltz scandal.

[Glengoyne]

Originally Posted by cartman

Yes. Not use the electronic machines until the issues that were revealed are addressed. The problems are so fundamental that the current crop of machines are basically not fixable.

DING! DING! DING!

I am solidly opposed to the touch screen voting systems. Not because I'm afraid of the "problems" being discussed. I haven't seen the above discussed program, but I largely believe the problems with security/reliability in the current machines are being over stated.

The biggest problem I have with them is their cost and reliability. We have perfectly good voting technology that has been proven over time. The scantron voting forms. They immediately tell you that there are problems with the ballot, not accepting the ballot until the issues are corrected.

I simply think that the computerized touch screen voting machines are wasteful, and probably not near as fool proof as other technologies that exist today. High tech isn't always the best solution, but not enough people with common sense are making these decisions in counties using this equipment.

[JPhillips]

Well Glen and I agree, how about that.

Optical scanning is the most reliable and secure voting method in the country. Its easy and verifiable. It should be the nationwide voting system.

Computer voting is currently like running Windows without a firewall or virus protection. Nobody on this board would suggest that setup, yet some of you are willing to say that voting booths without security are fine. When you can use a flash memory card to change voting tallies something is terribly wrong.

Something should be done ASAP. My hope is that the uproar over Venezualan ownership will finally get something done. Compared to other national expenditures it wouldn't cost much to switch to optical scanning.

Finally, is it partisan to say these machinces aren't secure or is it partisan to say it doesn't matter because Democrats are complaining?

[Mr. Wednesday]

Originally Posted by Glengoyne

I am solidly opposed to the touch screen voting systems. Not because I'm afraid of the "problems" being discussed. I haven't seen the above discussed program, but I largely believe the problems with security/reliability in the current machines are being over stated.

The fact is, many of the systems in use can be hacked by a single knowledgeable person, undetectably, to alter tabulation on a single machine or in an entire precinct. The amount of access required to do this varies from that of the average voter (attack on a single machine) to that of an average precinct worker (attack on a precinct). The attack requires readily available equipment.

Your average Joe off the street wouldn't be able to do this, but it's within reach of any sufficiently motivated computer hobbyist or professional who can get involved in election administration.

I don't think the problems are overstated at all.

[Airhog]

I think a big problem is there is no money in safe election machinces. The people who make these machines are more crooked than the officals running for office

[Glengoyne]

Originally Posted by Mr. Wednesday

The fact is, many of the systems in use can be hacked by a single knowledgeable person, undetectably, to alter tabulation on a single machine or in an entire precinct. The amount of access required to do this varies from that of the average voter (attack on a single machine) to that of an average precinct worker (attack on a precinct). The attack requires readily available equipment.

Your average Joe off the street wouldn't be able to do this, but it's within reach of any sufficiently motivated computer hobbyist or professional who can get involved in election administration.

I don't think the problems are overstated at all.

I guess what you are describing is possible. I just think that very minimal protections that almost have to be in place could prevent fraud. Now the loss of data would be another matter. I'll watch the show, and see what there is to see. It just is that what I've heard on NPR and from other media outlets doesn't jive with what you've described. In that, yes some things are possible, but the possibility of something happening are pretty remote.

So color me skeptical of both the computerized voting machines and the conspiracy theories surrounding them.

[SirFozzie]

Skeptic no more

http://www.kfmb.com/stories/story.68972.html


Just how easy is it to hack into a Diebold voting machine? Pretty easy, according to a demonstration video posted on the internet by researchers at Princeton University. They pick the lock on the side of the machine in less than 10 seconds. Then, they introduce a computer virus using a standard PC memory card.

The virus tricks the Diebold machine. Votes originally cast for pretend candidate George Washington are later printed out and recorded as votes for Benedict Arnold.

[Mr. Wednesday]

Originally Posted by Glengoyne

I guess what you are describing is possible. I just think that very minimal protections that almost have to be in place could prevent fraud.

At the precinct tabulation level, I'm not sure what (if any) protections are in place, nor how difficult it would be for an insider to gain the necessary access to game one of them. At the individual voting machine level, there are supposed to be locks -- which reportedly have ridiculously insecure keys that anybody interested could obtain -- and tamper-evident tape -- which testers have bypassed with little difficulty.

[Glengoyne]

Originally Posted by SirFozzie

Skeptic no more

http://www.kfmb.com/stories/story.68972.html


Just how easy is it to hack into a Diebold voting machine? Pretty easy, according to a demonstration video posted on the internet by researchers at Princeton University. They pick the lock on the side of the machine in less than 10 seconds. Then, they introduce a computer virus using a standard PC memory card.

The virus tricks the Diebold machine. Votes originally cast for pretend candidate George Washington are later printed out and recorded as votes for Benedict Arnold.

See, I don't know. If you read the article, it clearly says that the machines in use are utilizing encryption. There are absolutely trivial measures that would identify if a memory card or the imbedded software has been modified. I'd estimate that there is a much greater danger that someone could cause the loss of electronic votes, but actually tampering with them seems highly improbable.

Again, all of that said, I'm no fan of the computerized voting systems. There are better cheaper technologies that should be used instead of these systems. Cost, Security, and audit capabililty are elements of my concern. Security just isn't as big a hole in the idea as the other two in my opinion.

NPR did a report on this type of thing a couple of weeks ago.
On the virus thing, yes they did infect a machine, but it wasn't an actual voting machine used in any elections, and the tampering was easilly detected.
On the hacking into a card or the system...Some state provided a few dozen hackers with the design specifications of the machines in advance, and gave them the opportunity to tamper with the machines. None of the hackers were able to pull off anything resembling a success.

[cartman]

There's still an accuracy problem with them outside of any hacking issues. There was an article in the paper this morning that Williamson County in Texas is probably not going to use their electronic machines after they failed a dry run for a second time. Here's the article:

hxxp://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/11/04/4voting.html

[Glengoyne]

Originally Posted by cartman

There's still an accuracy problem with them outside of any hacking issues. There was an article in the paper this morning that Williamson County in Texas is probably not going to use their electronic machines after they failed a dry run for a second time. Here's the article:

hxxp://www.statesman.com/news/content/news/stories/local/11/04/4voting.html

This is the kind of thing, that seems like it is a much bigger problem. The computerized machines have added complexity, and introduced a myriad of vulnerabilities to the system. Common sense told me that back in 2001, after Florida, but I wasn't consulted.

[cartman]

It appears that finally a paper trail is going to be required for electronic voting machine. Still a ways to go, but this is a great step in the right direction.

hxxp://www.internetnews.com/bus-news/article.php/3646231

A federal agency is set to recommend significant changes to specifications for electronic-voting machines next week, internetnews.com has learned.

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is recommending that the 2007 version of the Voluntary Voting Systems Guidelines (VVSG) decertify direct record electronic (DRE) machines.

DREs are currently used by more than 30 percent of jurisdictions across the U.S. and are the exclusive voting technology in Delaware, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland and South Carolina.

According to an NIST paper to be discussed at a meeting of election regulators at NIST headquarters in Gaithersburg, Md., on Dec. 4 and 5, DRE vote totals cannot be audited because the machines are not software independent.

In other words, there is no means of verifying vote tallies other than by relying on the software that tabulated the results to begin with.

The machines currently in use are "more vulnerable to undetected programming errors or malicious code," according to the paper.

The NIST paper also noted that, "potentially, a single programmer could 'rig' a major election."

It recommends "requiring SI [software independent] voting systems in VVSG 2007."

The NIST is also going to recommend changes to the design of machines equipped with paper rolls that provide audit trails.

Currently, the paper rolls produce records that are illegible or otherwise unusable, and NIST is recommending that "paper rolls should not be used in new voting systems."

The lack of software independence has reared its ugly head in Sarasota's Congressional race, where 18,000 fewer votes were cast than in other races on the same ballot.

A recount was futile in that election because Sarasota uses a DRE-type machine.

This has provoked concerns that someone tampered with that election.

County officials told internetnews.com that the machines themselves are now being examined by a team of computer security experts and that they will finish their work by Friday.

Congress has also been on the case.

Hearings were held throughout the summer and fall, and legislation was introduced that would require the use of some form of voter-verified paper audit trail (VVPAT).

These efforts have gathered steam in response to reported machine malfunctions during the March 2006 primaries, as well as studies by the Brennan Center and Princeton University professor Ed Felten, as well as pressure from advocacy groups such as VotersUnite.org.

But evidence is emerging to the effect that paper trails may not be of much help.

For instance, a study of the 2006 primaries in Ohio commissioned by Cuyahoga County, Ohio, showed that the results of that election could not be verified despite the presence of VVPAT.

The study concluded that "the election system, in its entirety, exhibits shortcomings with extremely serious consequences, especially in the event of a close election."

Many former advocates of VVPAT, including John Gideon, executive director of VotersUnite, now favor requiring that all votes be recorded on paper ballots.

"DREs are unacceptable as voting devices and ... the addition of a VVPAT on a DRE is only a placebo to make some voters feel more comfortable," Gideon said in an e-mail.

Computer scientists and election experts such as Roy Saltman disagree with the idea of going back to paper ballots. "If you insist on paper you're tying elections to an old technology," he told internetnews.com.

Doug Jones of the University of Iowa suggested that election officials consider implementing new technologies that enable independent auditing of votes.

He pointed to a system devised by Ted Selker, co-director of the CalTech-MIT Voting Technology Project. "The state of the art systems aren't even on the market."

[wade moore]

Agreed, step in the right direction.

[Mr. Wednesday]

Without knowing the exact details of the implementation, I like the system in St. Joseph County in Indiana. We voted on paper ballots, and cast them into what appeared to be a point-of-submission scanner. Paper ballots plus optical scanners seem to me to be the sweet spot of fast counting plus optimum verifiability.

[Glengoyne]

Originally Posted by wade moore

Agreed, step in the right direction.

I'm not so sure. More like a false sense of security. Some of the places with "receipts" and paper trails, wound up with 10% plus of the receipts being blank. This was due to a variety of reasons. Paper jams, lack of ink/toner, lack of training and or incompetence on the part of precinct workers. Oh my favorite was the place that had eighteen thousand ballots where no one voted in a Congressional district race(I think it was a Congressional race). The cause? Poor ballot design within the touch screen. People just over looked it without knowing it was there.

The smart folks are in the districts throwing away their touch screen machines, and returning to more traditional tried and true methods.