WDYK: American Civil War

[Anrhydeddu]

WDYK = What Do You Know, which was what a few of us wrote on back at the old place and inspired by the “turning point” thread, here was what I wrote on the American Civil War.

What has attracted me to studying this conflict is that it was, in my opinion, the most significant turning point in American history. It had been a long time in developing and when it arrived, it came with a tremendous force. And the change it made to a whole region was phenomenal. My long time interest in history, particularly American History, focuses on studying change – not only to the settlement of the lands but also in peoples’ way of lives. The American Civil War (hereafter, ACW) resulted in phenomenal changes, not only to the Southern region and its white and black populations, but also in the North in its response to managing and fighting the war.

As a historian, I try to read, understand and analyze from all points of view, even one as polarized as the ACW. However, my personal bias is slanted towards the Union because I firmly believe in the political goal of maintaining the Union of all states and in the moral goal of ending slavery in this country. I’m not sure how much I can realistically touch on here but I want to generally focus on ‘why’ they fought and ‘why’ it came out like it did, both militarily and politically. We’ll see how this goes, especially since I don’t have any of my resources in front of me as I write this.

What led up to the war?

Simply put, the ACW was to have been the political solution that was resolved militarily in the question of the expansion of Free States and Slave States. The states that become the Confederacy wanted a permanent compromise in the US Senate in determining whether a territory (and hence, a new state) should be free or slave. At least they wanted to give the population of such territory or state the choice. The northern states really didn’t care one way or another but strongly desired to gather as many territories and new states to its economics influence; and to keep its flow of goods northwards and to control its flow to and from the southern ports. Why this became a critical issue is that by the mid-1800s, the northern states were beginning to turn from an agrarian-based economy to one centered on manufacturing. It had just gone through a major boom in immigration (mainly Irish and German) so it had the labor to supply new industries and it needed the expansion westward, not only to feed the population but relieve the pressure on the growing northern cities. The Southern senators and representatives knew that they were being squeezed and were losing political clout. They had to push for new territories and states, not because they needed slavery to expand but to maintain representation in Washington and in keeping their agrarian-based economies focused southwards. Most folks, North and South, during that period were still very provincial and not caring much what happened elsewhere, except in two things that ultimately led to war. The first was the abolition movement in some of the northern cities. This was a small, but very vocal advocacy movement that commanded the mainstream media of the period: the newspapers and the pulpits. This was in part a moral issue obviously but it was also a political issue in that it was used as a tool to urge support for anti-southern agendas, especially on the national scene. The second thing had to do with how Southerners were brought into the conflict. It was not so much how Southerners thought Northerners viewed slavery, for only 20% of the population owned slaves, it was the Northern politicians wanting to control the Southern ports and the movements of their goods. This was done, in part, through tariffs, favoritism in government contracts and control of shipping lanes. In others words, the North wanted to expand and control, the South wanted to be left alone. With the emotions of the abolitionists and the free/slave states debates, it had to come to a climax, and it did in 1860.

What was the climax?

When Abraham Lincoln was elected in 1860 after a very acrimonious campaign among three candidates each with definable, differentiated views, the South played its trump card – secession. It had threatened to do so many times before but with Lincoln’s election and the South’s perception that he was anti-slavery and anti-southern (he wasn’t), they seceded and formed the Confederacy in order to gain control of what they were losing - their ports and their economies. One of the many great ironies of the ACW was that the Confederacy, with all of its noise about “States Rights”, had to model its government exactly by the American Constitution, with the amendment of the right to expansion of slavery being the only difference.

So why did it lead to war?

Very simply, the Union (as the non-Confederate states were known) did not officially recognize the Confederacy and unofficially were ticked that the nation founded by Washington, Adams, Franklin, Jefferson et al was torn apart. The Union had to do everything in its power to keep the United States (that is, ALL of the states) together in order to ensure its clout and future potential among the world’s nations. Mexico during that time was taken over by the French; British Canada was growing again and of course, the superpowers of Europe: England, France, Prussia and the Austrian Empire were still very strong. Remember, the US was only an official nation less than 75 years at that time and was on the verge of the Industrial Revolution. It could not afford to lose control over crucial resources. That was the rallying cry to get the population of the Union to combat the Confederacy.

The rallying cry in the South was “States Rights” which was just a euphemism for “just leave us alone to manage our own people and resources”. And to assert that point, they wanted control of a Union fort in Charleston harbor. That was the spark that Lincoln and his Cabinet had been waiting for. It was one thing to rally around the concept of a United States of America, but folks in the North took it personally that their own countrymen would wage war against them. Lincoln called for 75,000 volunteers for 3 months to “put down the rebellion” within its national borders and got them with ease. In response, Jefferson Davis, the president of the Confederate States likewise called for volunteers because the “time for compromise has passed”. Besides, they were really itching for a fight and so the solution would have to be a military one.

What was the military solution?

One of the greatest examples of change in the ACW was the attitude of the population and more importantly, of the soldiers that went off to fight. The initial 75,000 volunteers in the Union (and subsequent ones throughout the summer of 1861) went to war with all of the pomp and circumstances that could be mustered. (Contrast that to the dark and gloomy view we see later in the war!) Such hype was planned because the politicians knew it had to “market” the war because it was asking the Northern people to fight a war away from its home, against its own countrymen. Also, despite what the early soldiers and the press said about wanting to get down there as quickly as possible so as to not miss out on the action, the Lincoln administration knew that it likely would be a tough war. The reason is that there was over 2000 miles of border against the Confederacy to attack and defend. So the main strategy was try to reduce the border as much as possible. The plan that was submitted by General Winfield Scott (hero of the War of 1812 and Mexican War) was the Anaconda Plan – blockade the Southern ports to prevent resources from going in and out, and to capture the Mississippi River, thus driving a crucial wedge into the Confederacy. His plan was ridiculed by the young, hot shot generals saying that Scott was too old (he was, but not his mind) and that it went against the hype of a short war. Lincoln in his extremely astute political mind tabled the plan publicly but in the end, it was the grand strategy that won the war for the Union. The other brilliant thing Lincoln did early on was to recognize the extremely critical nature of the three border states: Maryland, Kentucky and Missouri. These states were not Union or Confederate but had sympathizers from both sides. Lincoln knew that he had to hold onto Maryland or else Washington DC would have been isolated. He had to hold on to Kentucky to maintain the great Ohio River route; and Missouri for its Mississippi River junctions and the city of St. Louis. He had a different political strategy for each and in the end, he managed to keep them out of Confederate control for any length of time.

What was the Confederate’s plan?

They didn’t have one, mainly because they didn’t need one for they were the defenders. They didn't need to rally support (at least in the first two years of the war) because “Southern Pride” was all they needed to recruit soldiers and to have its population endure sacrifice for the war effort. Even if it had to have a grand strategy, it would not have been able to come up with one. Throughout the war and especially in the first year, it was embroiled in internal squabbling over the role of the central government versus the role of the states, particularly in the building of the “Confederate” army. Half of the politicians maintained throughout the war that it had to be up to the separate states to fight against the Union army invading its borders and ports. Combine this faction with the inability of Jefferson Davis to build political consensus, it was a wonder that the Confederacy held together for so long.

Actually, the Confederates did have one plan; it was based on King Cotton. They accurately foresaw that they would need England and France as allies in their efforts against the more powerful Union. Both of these European powers (which had considerable controlling interest in the Western Hemisphere) were officially neutral but would recognize the Confederacy if it were in their best interests. The key interest that Jefferson Davis was counting on was cotton for the European textile mills. Davis and his administration tried two tactics to get recognition. The first was to send diplomats to negotiate an agreement. Unfortunately for the Confederates, he sent a couple of amateurs that bungled it badly. The second was to withhold shipments of cotton to England and France in hope that would they would be forced to recognize and support the Confederacy. Not only were England and France offended by such blackmail, but due to a glut of cotton shipments from the South the past few years, they had enough supply to last a long while. While King Cotton was a trump card, the Confederates played it badly and lost its only leverage in gaining substantial support against the Union.

So it was a real war?

Oh yes and that’s why the ACW is so fascinating to many, many folks. The personalities involved, the captivating strategies and tactics, the great momentum swings and the transformation from war being “romanticized” to one that previewed modern 20th-century warfare all make great anecdotes, enough to fill volumes. I’m only going to touch upon a few of them.

When many of the early Union volunteers reached the camps around Washington in late Spring of 1861, they were upset with camp life and its constant drilling. Unfortunately, many of them slacked off for a great number of “officers” who were supposed to train them were non-military politicians who got caught up in the hype and glory and wanted to become a hero back home. Across the Potomac, you had a “Confederate” army under Beauregard mainly consisting of the Virginia militia, not that much better trained because they felt they didn’t need to be. After all, one Southern soldier, especially in the cavalry, was worth 10 Northern soldiers, right? Plus, there were defending their home soil.

By early summer, there were intense pressures from the Northern newspapers, as well as from politicians to get after the Rebel army and be done with it. So Lincoln, against his personal wishes but had to bow to political realities, sent McDowell and the Army of the Potomac against the enemy under Beauregard. This first major battle was the First Battle of Bull Run (or in the South, Battle of Manassas Junction). There were many things quite comical about this battle. First, the general staff devised a very complex strategy of feints, countermarches and flanking movements that was well beyond the capabilities of the officers and the men they commanded. The Confederate army was actually broken in two, Beauregard around Manassas and Johnston in the Shenendoah Valley. Patterson’s army around Harper’s Ferry was supposed to have kept Johnston occupied thus preventing him from joining up with Beauregard. He just had his army march back and forth, making some noise but keeping at a safe distance so not to engage. Johnston just left him there in the Valley and arrived in Manassas (by train, which was the first time that had been used in that manner!) just in time. McDowell’s plan was to have been a surprise but everyone, I mean EVERYONE in Washington and Richmond knew that the army was going to move on the appointed date and in what manner. But unfortunately, some of the division commanders didn’t get the orders or they were unclear or just ignored. In what later armies would cover in a half a day, they took three days to get their destination around Manassas Junction. That gave time for the Washington party-goers to pack up a picnic lunch, get in their buggies and head to the hills around Manassas to watch the men in their glorious colors engage and put down the rebellion once and for all. It almost worked.

Beauregard’s army didn’t know how to fight or follow orders any better than McDowell’s, which is what Lincoln was counting on. The Army of the Potomac actually had gained much of the field, pushing the Confederates back to a defensive position (much to the delight of their audience). But just when McDowell was regrouping for a final push, Johnston’s army arrived on the scene and turned a defeat into victory. It was then that the Union army first heard the Rebel Yell and being tired, hungry and terrified, some of them just ran back to Washington. Well, remember those party-goers? They had seen enough, especially when some of the ambulances with their bloody, mangled men went screaming by them, they packed up and jammed the main road back to Washington. This was also the road that the army was to take back and so we had a mass of unprepared civilians tangled with a cranky army all trying to get back home. It was not a pretty sight. Beauregard could have pressed his advantage, especially when Jefferson Davis showed up, but he and his army was content with picking up souvenirs from that day. From that moment on, both sides knew that the war would not be over with any time soon and that they had to settle down for a long, drawn out fight.

Umm, where was General Lee?

The Confederate soldiers that heard of him called him “Granny Lee”. He was involved in an earlier skirmish in western Virginia and chose not to fight but retreat (for a good reason), so they sent him down to South Carolina to watch over some coastal defenses. Even though he would become Jefferson Davis’ top military adviser soon after Bull Run, he would not take command in the field until April of 1862.

All of the fighting took place in and around Virginia?

No, not even close, but you would never know it from many of the newspapers/journals of that time and in many of the books written since then. With the media centered in Washington and Richmond (plus the influential newspapers of the Northern cities, which is how Richmond got much of its news), that was what most folks heard about. But here was a phrase from after the war that I agree with, “[the war] would be won in the west and lost in the east”. The Eastern Theatre was everything east of the Appalachia Mountains, including all of Virginia, Maryland, Georgia and Pennsylvania, where the big eastern battles were fought. The Western Theatre included Tennessee, Kentucky and the Mississippi River area. There were many other places where battles took place, ranging from the English Channel to the Gulf of Mexico to Colorado and other places far out west. But the big armies campaigned in those two Theatres. So what did it mean that it “would be won in the west and lost in the east”? The Eastern Theatre had the “all or nothing” goals of Washington or Richmond, as well as the most visible commanders and armies. If either of those two cities were captured or if the Army of Northern Virginia (under Lee) or the Army of the Potomac (under various leadership) were to have been destroyed, the war would probably had been ended. For the Union, the military key was the Western Theatre. If they could maintain the Ohio River route and captured the entire Mississippi River, then they would have been in a great position to launch campaigns into the interior South and to cripple the Southern economy along with the blockades. They did just that and while that by itself did not produce victory, it reduced the effectiveness of Lee’s army and the will of the Southern people to continue with the war, thus assuring the final superiority of Grant’s Army of the Potomac in forcing Lee to surrender.

[Anrhydeddu]

Continuing on…

What happened after First Bull Run?

Lincoln called on that conceited, arrogant prick, George McClellan. He had a messiah complex, thinking that he alone would save the Union. He was a brilliant organizer and drillmaster, which is exactly what the Army of the Potomac needed at that time. However, as it became evident during the Peninsula and Antietam Campaigns, he was incapable of fighting. He purposely came up with excuses and laid blames for not engaging the enemy because he wanted the glory, the attention and the adulation but with none of the risks. Meanwhile in the Western Theatre, the Union had the emergence of a fighting general, U.S. Grant. Grant took an army corps and secured the confluence of the Cumberland, Tennessee and Ohio Rivers and eventually pushed his way down to the critical rail junction at Corinth, Mississippi 200 miles to the south, fighting a major battle at Shiloh along the way.

When General Lee took over command of the Army of Northern Virginia when McClellan was crawling up the peninsula, he went on the offensive using the axiom, ‘the best defense is an offense’. Lee had the uncanny ability to gauge the weaknesses of his opponent, whether it was McClellan’s caution, Burnside’s recklessness or Pope’s brashness. When he turned his army northwards in the Antietam campaign in late Summer of 1862, he did not have any designs on capturing Northern territories. Instead his goal was twofold: to relieve pressure on Richmond and the State of Virginia (esp. with the harvest coming in) and to continue the string of military victories in hoping they would convince England and France to finally recognize and support the Confederacy (since diplomatic efforts have failed). Lincoln knew that was Lee’s motivation and drafted an Emancipation Proclamation in declaring the slaves would become free. However, he couldn’t have issued (or allowed) such a thing at the beginning of the war because that would have shattered the fragile coalition to get the war efforts moving. He also couldn’t have issued it when he drafted it because that would have looked liked a desperate move in face of a string of Union defeats in the east. He had to wait until a noticeable Union victory and he got it with Antietam on September 17, 1862.

Ironically, it was McClellan who was at the command of the Army of the Potomac that clashed with Lee’s army at Antietam Creek in what is know as the bloodiest day in American history. But it was not a Union victory, per se. It was technically a draw because while the Union did not gain the field held by the Confederates, they did enough damage to turn Lee’s army back to Virginia. McClellan, of course, hailed himself as the Great Victor and then sat there for a month doing nothing. They could have crushed Lee’s army during the retreat but McClellan was too busy getting his army prepared for parades and grand reviews. But in the end, Lincoln had his ‘victory’ to announce the EP. This brilliant move did two significant things. First, it forever ended the chances of England and France in recognizing the Confederacy because they were not going to officially support a nation that constitutionally sanctioned slavery. Second, it changed the tone of the war from an overtly political one to a subvertly moral one. However, they knew that most of the Union officers and soldiers were not going to fight against slavery, it was more to the effect of reducing the Confederate soldiers’ will to fight for slavery. By freeing slaves at gunpoint (in areas where the Union army held), it hastened the crippling of the Southern economy and introduced fresh labor into the Union ranks, while providing good PR for the folks back home. Lincoln stuck with this plan throughout the remainder of the war despite fierce opposition from the moderates in the Republican part and of course, all of the Northern Democrats. Because he knew by freeing the slaves, the South would never be as strong economically, nor have the strong will to continue to sacrifice for the war effort.

So that’s why the South lost?

That is a loaded question and one that can never, ever be answered completely or accurately. Much of what I will be summarizing comes from James McPherson’s book, “Drawn With The Sword” in which he analyzes much of the literature surrounding “why the South lost” and “why the North won”.

For nearly 140 years, folks have been coming up with reasons why the ACW came out like it did. The reasons fall into two categories: internal (Why the South lost) and external (Why the North won). This mindgame can be seen in using Gettysburg as a microcosm. The blame for the Confederate’s loss at Gettysburg in July 1863 ranges from Lee’s mismanagement, over confidence and poor judgement; Jeb Stuart’s absence; Ewell and Early for not taking Cemetery Hill on the first day [very critical in my opinion] to the alleged lack of cooperation from Longstreet. When they asked Pickett after the war of why they lost at Gettysburg, he replied, “I’ve always thought the Yankees had something to do with it.”, which shifted to external reasons.

For the war as a whole, the internal reasons included ‘internal conflicts’ (as alluded to earlier) and ‘State Rights’. Such explanations can only go so far because like with internal conflicts, that was more prevalent in the Union than in the Confederacy. External reasons included the well-worn ‘superior numbers of the Union’. Lee in his Farewell Address said that “the Army of Northern Virginia has been compelled to yield to overwhelming numbers and resources.” This is the most common reason given but it is not accurate in explaining why the South lost or North won. Lee said this primarily to preserve their pride in the courage and skill of the Confederate soldiers, and to reconcile their defeat with a sense of honor. This, more than anything else, led to the phenomenon known as the “Lost Cause”. In others words, the Confederacy fought gallantly and were morally right against an opponent that just mass of bodies at them. That doesn’t wash, in my opinion. If overwhelming numbers and resources always determined the winner, than you wouldn’t have the successful Netherlands rebellion against Spain or my favorite, the American colonists defeating Great Britain. The superior numbers and resources were necessary to conquer the vast South but it wasn’t the cause for victory. Another external reason given is the alienation of the non-slaveholding white populations and the black populations in the South. That’s not a bad explanation and certainly a factor, but during the American Revolution, you had even more of an alienated population with the loyalists and many slaves joining the British. Yet somehow, the Americans won while the Confederacy did not.

Ok, so what do you think are the factors?

Glad you asked. It cannot be pinpointed to one reason or to one battle. Let me give you three reasons:

1. Generalship. The Confederacy certainly had better generals in the Eastern Theatre during the first half of the war, but none at all in the Western Theatre (where the Confederates only won ONE major victory – at Chickamauga). Nearly all of the best Union generals came out of the West (Grant, Sherman, Thomas, Sheridan) and when they came east, they had the ability to better use the Union’s resources. This was especially true in Grant becoming commander of all of the armies, thus able to coordinate the strategies on all fronts. Lee, despite his tactical abilities, never paid any attention to the Confederate armies outside of Virginia where his influence concentrated Confederate resources at the expense of the Western Theatre. The Confederates lost the war because it lost it in the west.

2. Management of military supplies and logistics. By 1862, a group of top- and middle-level managers (including Stanton in the War Dept, Quartermaster Meigs, et al) organized the Northern economy and the logistical flow of supplies and transportation to Union armies with unprecedented efficiency and abundance. The Confederacy could not match (it tried as best as it could though) Northern skill in organization, financing and administration.

3. Leadership at the top. Simply said, Lincoln was a far better Commander-in-Chief than Jefferson Davis. This does not mean that Lincoln was perfect in this role (e.g., he listened to wrong advice on choosing some of the early generals); he was flexible, pragmatic, diplomatic and had a sense of humor. Davis was austere, rigid, humorless and made enemies easily.

So in the end, it wasn’t the Union’s “overwhelming numbers and resources” that won the war for them, it was the proper use of those numbers and resources. This, in turn, kept the pressures on the Confederacy in getting the South to lose the will to fight. This does not mean that it lacked the will but with constant internal and external economic/military/political pressures, it became too much to bear, both on the homefront and on the front lines. No matter how many victories Lee had in the east, the Union army was still there getting re-enforced and re-supplied.

But all of the proper generalship, leadership and management could not, by themselves, win a military victory against a determined enemy. There were three key points during the war that the North could have lost it – in other words, lost their will to continue fighting and pressured the Lincoln Administration is suing for peace.

Don’t keep us in suspense, what were those three key points?

1. The Summer of 1862 where the Confederates took to their first offensives in both the east and west and reaching the Ohio River and Potomac River. As mentioned earlier, the main reasons for this strategy were to get a victory on Union soil and to win European recognition. They failed at Perryville in Kentucky and at Antietam in Maryland. This forestalled European intervention, dissuaded Northern voters from repudiating the Lincoln Administration by electing a Democratic House in the fall elections and gave Lincoln the occasion to issue the Emancipation Proclamation.

2. The Summer of 1863 where there were some defeats in the west and Lee was heading towards Pennsylvania unopposed. Northern morale dropped to its second lowest point in the war (the next point was the lowest). Then came Gettysburg in the east and Vicksburg in the west.

3. August of 1864 where the Confederacy actually had the best chance of winning. This was not so much in victory on the battlefields but getting the Union to stop fighting and negotiate a peace settlement. At that time, Grant was stalled around Petersburg after suffering heavy casualties and Sherman was stalled before Atlanta; and Lincoln was given no chance to win the re-election coming up in November 1864 against the Democrats (McClellan, no less!). But as we know, Sherman captured Atlanta and Sheridan had great victories against Early in the Valley. This turned Northern opinion from despair in August to confident determination in November, coupled that with the loss of will in the South, the end was near.

[RendeR]

Very impressive sumnation. Its a great read as well. I learned a few things from this that I hadn't read before. very well put together.


Ren

[Barkeep49]

What an excellent job and some really interesting interpretations along the way. If you wouldn't mind (and I can find the time) I would like to add a prologue better explaining how we got to the start of the Civil War.

[KWhit]

Very interesting, indeed. This content of this board amazes me.

Reminds me of that guy whose trying to post the collected works of William Shakespeare on Literotica.

Which, ... um..., is of course why I frequent that site (not for the dirty stories).



Brush up your Shakespeare,
Start quoting him now.
Brush up your Shakespeare,
And the women you will wow.

[Fritz]

Originally posted by KWhit
Very interesting, indeed. This content of this board amazes me.

Reminds me of that guy whose trying to post the collected works of William Shakespeare on Literotica.

Anrhydeddu was behind that as well.

[GoldenEagle]

Well done. Thank you for your in-depth discussion. I will have questions after I organaize my thougths

[Anrhydeddu]

Anrhydeddu was behind that as well.

Can't be, the only quote I know is "to be or not to be" and I don't have any idea even from what play it comes from.

[Fritz]

Then why did you name your Vespa "Ophilia?"

[WSUCougar]

Originally posted by Anrhydeddu
Can't be, the only quote I know is "to be or not to be" and I don't have any idea even from what play it comes from.

Star Trek VI: The Undiscovered Country

[HornedFrog Purple]

"What does God need with a starship?"

Anyways a couple of years ago I watched the Ken Burns documentary on the Civil War and I thought it was excellent.

[WSUCougar]

Originally posted by HornedFrog Purple
"What does God need with a starship?"

You are of course quoting from Star Trek V: The Really Bad One.

[Anrhydeddu]

GoldenEagle, please submit your questions before this gets totally out of hand.

[Bee]

Originally posted by WSUCougar
You are of course quoting from Star Trek V: The Really Bad One.

Was that the one with the whales?

[Anrhydeddu]

From another older FOFC thread:

Fwiw, my brother had been watching the PBS Civil War miniseries again and he forwarded several questions to me. For your enjoyment, here were the questions and my answers.

I'm always amazed with the incompetence of Gen McClellan, the general of the Potomac.

Ah yes, Genl McClellan, the most talked about general in American history. Here’s the nutshell about him. There are three important attributes to be a commanding general: organization, morale and fighting spirit. McClellan was one of the best of any general at organization. He took the ragtagged Army of the Potomac after Bull Run and spent 9 loooong months shaping it into an effective army. All throughout this process, he raised the morale of the troops to such a high level that many of them, even after the war, wished that he had commanded them to victory. He did this by numerous reviews, praise and providing them with anything they wanted. But there is the third thing, to fight. He was totally incapable of engaging the enemy, despite words to the contrary. He wanted ALL of the glory (he was a very vain, conceited person) but NONE of the risks to obtain that glory. Before the Peninsula Campaign, he used the excuse of building the army up to delay going down there. Once on the Campaign, he used the excuse of saying that the ANV’s forces significantly outnumbered his army (it was the other way around). Once he got into the Seven Day battles, the army had to fight but came up against Lee, who during the battle took over the ANV, and the defenses around Richmond. To his credit, McClellan did plan and execute getting his army out of there. There is one other thing. He absolutely hated Lincoln and his administration. This was a constant excuse he gave as to why did not beat the enemy ("their incompetant meddling" as he called it).

When Lincoln called upon him to “save the world” (in McClellan’s words) after 2nd Bull Run (which McClellan purposely caused Pope, another enemy of McClellan, to lose that battle), he again used the excuse of having to build up the army again to avoid confronting Lee, who was obviously heading north. One of the great ironies of the Civil War was that it was McClellan who was at the head of the army that engaged in the bloodiest single-day battle in American history. But it was purely by accident not by choice. McClellan during the whole time of Antietam did nothing strategically or tactically. He held one-third of the army out of action and was looking for a way to stop the engagement. When Lee retreated across the Potomac, McClellan claimed victory and gave himself the credit for sending Lee back to Virginia. But it was enough of a “victory” to permit Lincoln to issue the Proclamation and thus turning the war into a moral war and preventing the Europeans from recognizing Confederate independence. After Antietam, he used the well-worn excuse of saying that he needed to build the army back up after a devastating battle and it would take a long time to do. One of my favorite moments in the war came when Lincoln, again, imploring McClellan to get moving, McClellan gave the excuse of fatigued horses. This was weeks after the battle and Lincoln replied saying, “what in the world had the horses been engaged in to cause fatigued?” After 6 weeks, enough was enough and Lincoln relieved him for the last time when it became clear to everyone that the Army of the Potomac was McClellan’s personal bodyguard and toy to have fun with.

There is something else to consider. Much of McClellan’s hatred towards Lincoln and his administration was political. McClellan was a Peace Democrat and had favored, to some extent, suing for peace. He ran against Lincoln in 1864 on that platform, but it had been a historical debate whether McClellan truly believed in that platform (I don’t think he did) and if he had gotten elected, I don’t know if the war would have turned out differently.

Over and over it seemed that he had chances early on the crush the South. He was given Lee's troop plans, he could have easily gone into Richmond, he waited and waited on everything, and he refused to chase Lee after Antietam. Completion of any of these was said could have ended the war. My question is: Is that true?

No. First, he could not have easily gone into Richmond during the Seven Day Battles (the ANV had better position and more entrenched, except at Malvern Hill). As far as after Antietam, Lee was vulnerable because he had risked his army by going on the offensive (which was his failure again at Gettysburg) but even if McClellan had gotten to the ANV sooner (say on the 16th), it still would have been a bloody piecemeal battle. The same with afterwards, three Potomac corps were pretty well beaten and they had not learned to use the cavalry to scout so chasing after them would have been a fairly difficult thing to do.

As far as your last comment, would any of these have ended the war? No, because the Confederacy’s will to fight was strong and would remain strong for another year. Even Lee would had been quite damaged on the way back to Virginia, Richmond still was standing with tens of thousands of troops nearby and down in the Carolinas. Plus, don’t forget about the underrated Western Theatre which had two large Confederate armies battling across a vast territory of Confederate states.

How devastating would beating Lee have been, given how spread out the war was?

I don’t know actually. It was highly improbable that any battles during the first 2-3 years would have allowed casualties so high that an army becomes annihilated. If that had been the case after Antietam, then the armies would have been brought in from the Western Theatre to protect Richmond. As long as you had tens of thousands of Southerners willing to fight, and the Davis administration willing to fight, and a dozen slave states willing to defend their borders even if a Confederate army couldn’t, then the only way the South would have won was to reduce the will of the Northerners to fight (which they almost did).

Also, gettysburg is considered the big loss but the war still went on for what, a year more?

That was really the turning point in Lee's mind, not the high point as many believed since Vicksburg and the whole Mississippi River was about to fall. It was the turning point for Lee because he knew that he couldn’t beat the Army of the Potomac fighting the war he wanted to (which was a failed strategy in the first place). From then on, he did what he should have done all along and fight a defensive war in the South on the ground of his choosing. It did prolong the war because at that time with the rifled guns, you couldn’t win on the offensive but by buying enough time to force one side to want to stop fighting. When the siege started at Petersburg along with Atlanta falling (which saved Lincoln’s reelection), the Confederate nation knew that the end was at hand because the population wasn’t willing to sacrifice any further. In the end, it was about saving honor and pride that compelled them continue fighting to the bitter end.

Finally, if it would have really ended it, would that have achieved that same closure as the war did years later? I keep thinking that an early finish would have meant another war down the line, it already came really close again with Johnson. The problems left undone from WW1 lead to WW2, it seems the same would have happened if this war ended that quickly.

That is very good observation. In the world of Alternate History, this is called a second order change. What that means that even if the first order change would have been accomplished (like the South winning), it would be likely that a second order would have changed it back to the predicted results (like the North reorganizing a few years later and battling the South again). However, the causes of the Civil War remained, regardless who won. Slavery was the primary motivation that everyone had a position on but the differences between the Southern and Northern economies would have continued to cause conflicts. It had to be a total victory, both in East and the West, for the conflict to become moot, and that was exactly what Lincoln, Grant and Sherman accomplished (just like in WW2). That does not mean that such a solution was not without problems, but history dictates that you fix one problem completely before moving on to the next.

[Bee]

Interestingly enough, your brother is not nearly as verbose as you are.

[Axxon]

Originally posted by Anrhydeddu
Can't be, the only quote I know is "to be or not to be" and I don't have any idea even from what play it comes from.

Well, as I am a Shakespeare buff and this does sorta deal with WYDK I'll answer this.

It is from Hamlet, Act 3, Scene 1 . Many say it is Hamlet contemplating the pros and cons of suicide but I disagree. You'd get the question right on a test going with the suicide thing but I don't buy it.

Consider Hammy's situation.

1. He has been told by a ghost that his uncle murdered his father. It is important to note that the ghost was NOT his father as ghosts during Shakespeares time were not souls of dead individuals. They were simply apparitions which is far more freaky.

Note at the beginning of the play when the ghost first appears we have this discussion which illustrates this point quite clearly.

MARCELLUS
Peace, break thee off; look, where it comes again!

BERNARDO
In the same figure, like the king that's dead.

MARCELLUS
Thou art a scholar; speak to it, Horatio.

BERNARDO
Looks it not like the king? mark it, Horatio.

HORATIO
Most like: it harrows me with fear and wonder.

BERNARDO
It would be spoke to.

MARCELLUS
Question it, Horatio.

HORATIO
What art thou that usurp'st this time of night,
Together with that fair and warlike form
In which the majesty of buried Denmark
Did sometimes march? by heaven I charge thee, speak!

It might not be a big deal but this is something that most people don't know and I think it's cool. Plus it makes Hamlets decision more difficult as his info is from some THING and not his father. Also, it certainly proves that Horatio has big brass ones doesn't it?

2. He knows that he's going to be king one day. It's a given. All he has to do is not make waves and he's in solid. He has to blow off any revenge though. Remember, Claudius seems to like him before he starts screwing with him and he genuinely loves Gertrude so there's no reason to think Hamlet's future is in any way uncertain.

3. He believes the ghost though and is pissed off. He wants his revenge. In fact he IS willing to die for his revenge but it's not the desire for death that drives him it's this desire to get even. That's what he's getting at; which is better, sit back and be king eventually or pursue revenge and face death?

To be [act] or not to be [ not act ]. THAT is the question. Whether tis nobler in the mind to suffer the slings and arrows of outrageous fortune [ your uncle murdered your dad and is banging your mom ] or by opposing end them [ get revenge at whatever cost].

Hamlet chose option 1 of course and he did indeed act [ to be ] and he did get his revenge and he did die. I really find this explanation more reasonable than that he was so distraught over the discovery of the kings foul play drove him to the brink of suicide and madness. Hamlet wasn't the wimp that scholars want to make him out to be.

Then again, this is certainly a minority view offered IMHO.

Oh well, back to the Civil War.

[Anrhydeddu]

Originally posted by Bee
Interestingly enough, your brother is not nearly as verbose as you are.

It's the Historian's Disease. Btw, my brother is a grad student at USF and if you ask him a question on the philosophy or history of religion, you would think my answers were very short and cryptic!

Thanks, ax, my knowledge of Shakes just went up from 0.

[Axxon]

Originally posted by Anrhydeddu
It's the Historian's Disease. Btw, my brother is a grad student at USF and if you ask him a question on the philosophy or history of religion, you would think my answers were very short and cryptic!

Thanks, ax, my knowledge of Shakes just went up from 0.

NP.

BTW, I am surprised that as a history buff you aren't a Shakespeare fan. Even in his tragedies there is a lot of solid history and really cool stories there if you can just get past the language.

May I suggest "Asimovs guide to Shakespeare". Asimov goes through all the plays and relates the history surrounding the play both the actual facts as we know them and Shakespeare's enhancements. Good stuff for the history buff.

Asimov also wrote "asimov's guide to the bible" which does the same thing; it tells the history and explains the references without delving into the religious meanings ( as he was an athiest it wouldn't have done for him to address those issues ). I have learned more ancient history from that book than most everywhere else put together and it gives the bible quite a different perspective when you can relate to what was really being said as opposed to merely the words.

[GoldenEagle]

A couple of questions. First, is it true that after the first Bull Run the south could have marched straight to Washington DC and ended the war? Also wasn't their spectators watching the first Bull Run?

Is it true that England or France considered envading the US to try to get the land back it once owned?

And this is more of a personal question, but what do you know about the Battle of Brice's Crossroads? This is on my ancestors land, so I am interested.

I guess that is three or four questions.

[Anrhydeddu]

Even in his tragedies there is a lot of solid history

From my recent dabbles into medieval history, I have read more than a few times of how Shakes distorted the histories of the medieval kings (like Henry V) to turn them into something different (an Elizabethan king?). I'll have to dig up my source for that.

First, is it true that after the first Bull Run the south could have marched straight to Washington DC and ended the war?

No, because that's exactly where McDowell's army was, plus tens of thousands of recruits coming down and filling up the camps in and around Washington. Even as disorganized the armies and recruits were, don't overestimate the Confederate army and generals at that stage in the war. They were no likely to "march straight" anywhere than the Army of the Potomac could. The defenses of Washington were still be built at the time (but there were defenses) and after Bull Run, even Lee could not have taken Washington, esp. with the ring of 110-pounds parrot cannons around the city.

Also wasn't their spectators watching the first Bull Run?

You mean southern spectators? Sure, it was all a lark to them. Even Davis came up to see the scenery. But the difference was that they didn't really get in the way because Beauregard and Johnston just remained there.

Is it true that England or France considered envading the US to try to get the land back it once owned?

Not that I have ever read.

And this is more of a personal question, but what do you know about the Battle of Brice's Crossroads? This is on my ancestors land, so I am interested.

I will dig up an interest source at home from my library on this.

[ACStrider]

Very nicely done Anrhy..., it's good to see a full analysis put so succently. You raise a few points that are worth scanning over.

First of all, one of the issues that bugs me about Civil War debate is that so much of the time the question of succession becomes one of "was it slavery or states rights?" Growing up in the south but having my dad (from the north) as a history teacher gave me a little bit of both sides of the argument. I think when it comes down to it, I would agree with my dad. He argued (and I believe that you fall along the same lines here) that ultimately it does become a slavery issue because slavery was the basis for the southern economy. Without slavery, there is no states rights conflict.

The second thing I would like to reinterate that you point out is the importance of the western theater. Many people overlook the dominance that the North had in that theater because the successes of Lee in the Eastern theater took center stage. As you mentioned the only southern victory in the West of significance was Chickamauga. What's really interesting to note is that it could have been much worse for the north then what it was. This was a rare battle where an entire army was out and out on the run. You may find a battle where a division or regiment were routed and turn from combat to regroup, but it was extremely rare to see an entire army panic (only happened 2 or 3 times in the war...can't remember where off the top of my head, though). General Bragg for the South had an entire army at his disposal to press the offensive and absolutely shatter the Northern army but instead decided to hang out outside of Chattanooga.

[Bee]

Here's a link to a diary from the Civil War that talks a little about the Battle of Manassas. I thought it gave a good "feel" for what the thoughts were of the people during that time. Interesting read IMO.

[Axxon]

Originally posted by Anrhydeddu
From my recent dabbles into medieval history, I have read more than a few times of how Shakes distorted the histories of the medieval kings (like Henry V) to turn them into something different (an Elizabethan king?). I'll have to dig up my source for that.

Of course he did but you have to consider who his patrons were. Still, as these are plays not histories so the character interaction allows a more insightful look at the motives and midsets of both eras than by reading straight text and as long as you dovetail the plays with the real historys you're really getting two history lessons for the price of one.

As far as the civil war goes I've read a lot about it and don't consider myself an uninformed person by any means but I learned long ago that I would never learn as much about it as those most passionate about it ( my ancestors were still in Spain at this time ) so if I'd shut up and listen I would learn something. Most of the time I have been right and this is certainly no exception. Thank you for this thought proving thread.

[GoldenEagle]

Where exactly was the line drawn between the Western and Eastern theatre? I havent heard of many battles in Texas, and I know that none were fought California (a Union state). What was the point of California even joining? Did it send any troops?

[Anrhydeddu]

AC: I think your Dad is very astute. I personally think it is one of this country’s greatest tragedy (historically) has been the myth of the Lost Cause and volumes of literature that still pervades to this day. The fact that they wanted to provide their children and future generations of white Southerners with a “correct” narrative (insignificance of slavery) of the war is shameful.

I think if Bragg had a full army on the move, it still would have lost to a handful of Union sympathizers in Kentucky and Tennessee. Bragg was the Confederacy’s worse general (of the major ones) whom his own subordinates and peers had no faith in him. His crony, Jefferson Davis was the only one who wanted him propped up.

Ax: Couldn’t quite dig up the source but it went something like this. His raising of the stature of Richard II and Henry IV had more to do with patriotic fervor in England’s war against Spain at the time. Even though his tragedies were based on history, historical facts and the true nature of those monarchs were obscured by his artistic license and patriotic fervor. I think the criticism comes from that what many generations believed about those two monarchs (especially) came from the fictionalization of Shakespeare.

Eagle: I don’t how the theatres are talked about in history. At the time though, you had Army of the Cumberland, Army of the Tennessee and so forth. But Sherman took his western army and moved across into the eastern theatre, unless you defined the Eastern Theatre strictly as Virginia.

Here are the Unions troops by state: http://civilwarindiana.com/troop_summary.html

Forrest certainly clobbered Sturgis at Brice’s. From Weigely’s book: “Sturgis lost over 2000, 16 of 18 guns and 150 wagons. Unschooled except for about 6 months of elementary education, and thus completely untutored in the academic art of war, Forrest nevertheless employed at Brice’s Cross Roads a classic double envelopment that could have come straight from a military textbook.” This left Sherman’s right almost wide open but Sherman kept pushing his lines out to constantly turn Johnston out of one position after another (he was another one of those incompetent Confederate generals in the west).

[JPhillips]

Afer reading "Apostles of Disunion" by Charles Dew its impossible for me to not see slavery as the main issue leading to secession. Dew uses the comments of the Secession Commissioners that were sent by the lower southern states to the states that were on the fence. These make it clear that the states that seceeded first told the others that they should seceed because of slavery.

Some quotes from Dew's book.

Mississippi's commissioner to Georgia closed his statement with,
"Sink or swim, live or die, survive or perish, the part of Mississippi is chosen, she will never submit to this Black Republican Administration.
She had rather see the last of her race, men, women, and children, immolated in one common funeral pile, than see them subjected to the degradation of civil, political and social equality with the negro race."

Alabama's commissioner to Delaware said that Lincoln sought,
"the establishment of an equality of races in our midst."

Georgia's commissioner to Virginia stated the reason for Georgia's secession,
"This reason may be summed up in a single proposition. It was a conviction, a deep conviction on the part of Georgia, that a seperation from the North was the only thing that could prevent the abolition of slavery."

Prominent Southern orator John Preston Smith said in 1861,
"the conflict between slavery and non-slavery is a conflict for life and death."

Don't ever let anyone tell you that slavery was a peripheral issue. That sort of revisionism happened after the South's defeat as a way to justify their cause. As states tried to convince each other to seceed, the one theme they returned to over and over was the "Black Republican's" unholy desire to see the black man as equal to the white.

[GoldenEagle]

I agree. I definanlty think slavery was the main cause of the war.

[RawIsDan]

Nice read Anrhydeddu. I found it very interesting.

[AgPete]

Originally posted by WSUCougar
You are of course quoting from Star Trek V: The Really Bad One.

ROFL! Sorry, OT laugh! That's a great title!

[Anrhydeddu]

JPhillips, very nicely done. Of all of my Civil War books I have read, I don't any of them effected me more (as in anger) than reading the collection of essays and analysis from the superb book, "The Myth of the Lost Cause and Civil War History". The Lost Cause has been a very deliberate attempt at revisionist (read: falsifying) history and for over 100 years, it is still going on. I would love write some summaries from that book but I am afraid that it would piss off our southern sympathizers even more.

[SackAttack]

Originally posted by GoldenEagle
Is it true that England or France considered envading the US to try to get the land back it once owned?

I find it unlikely that France would have done much of anything, primarily because they never 'lost' land to the Americans in the first place. Florida, as I recall, changed hands from the French to the Spanish, who then ceded it to America following the Spanish-American War, and much of the land west of the Mississippi River was simply purchased from the French.

That said, the French had an interest in a divided America - a friendly South would likely be more amenable to the French presence in Mexico, not to mention the fact that a distracted North wouldn't be in any shape to fight a two-front war. It'd have the effect, essentially, of leaving the gold and silver-rich states of California and Nevada helpless if the French chose to make a move.

England, on the other hand, would have had a couple of reasons had they chosen to launch an attack. They were still smarting, naturally, from their expulsion from the American colonies as a result of the Revolutionary War. You may recall that the war of 1812 was fought largely over the fact that British warships were stopping American merchant ships at sea and impressing their passengers into the British Navy. The Northern navy didn't do anything quite THAT extreme to British ships during the Civil War, but they DID board at least one British ship that was carrying a pair of Confederate passengers (ambassadors, you might say) to England with a request for help.

Call it hypocritical, but that move incensed the British, and if not for the fact that Prince Albert's cooler head prevailed (around a week before his untimely death, in fact), Britain might well have entered the war on the Confederate side.

Whether or not a Confederate/British alliance would have won the war is a matter for writers of alternate historical fiction, although it certainly seems reasonable. The advent of the North's ironclad ships might have caused some havoc among the British navy, but one has to think that England would eventually have adapted.

As to whether or not England would have gained back land lost, well...that all depends on whether or not the two sides would have fought to a draw, or if the Confederate/British alliance would have won a decisive victory.

Long story short, I don't think either the French or the British would have attacked for the sake of "gaining back land," but that might have been an ancillary benefit had they joined the war.

Josh

[JPhillips]

Anrhydeddu: I really love "Apostles of Disunion". It does a better job than anything I have seen of proving the states seceeded because of slavery. I could have given another one hundred quotes that I found in that book. Its great to have around when I start hearing the "War of Northern Aggression" crap.

[GoldenEagle]

Thanks for the info Josh. I don't know where exactly I picked up on the info that England or France might attack a divided country. The reasoning that they didn't attack was that they were afraid the North and South would reunite, and with all the troops and weapons easily defeat the invaders. Which, in return, probably would have led to a peace agreement between the two. Again, I don't remember where I read this or how crediable the source was, but I thought it was interesting none of the less.

[SackAttack]

I don't think there was really much of a fear of American reunification. You have to understand that the Confederacy was actively *seeking* European aid in their fight against the North. They didn't have a navy capable of breaking the Union blockade, so any assistance that the British could have provided would have been incredibly beneficial to their cause.

Ditto French manpower (don't laugh) on the infantry side of things, especially when you consider that the Union had basically three things going for them:

1) Far greater numbers. The South was predominantly an agrarian society, and as such didn't have nearly the same population levels as the cities of the North.

2) Industry. Goes without saying, but if you've got the factories where the guns, ammunition, clothing, etc are manufactured, and your opponent doesn't, you're already a step ahead of the game, because you don't have to be as conservative in battle.

3) The navy. The Union was able to block Southern ports, which went a long way towards reducing the ability of the Confederacy to resupply their army. If you don't have factories and you can't get goods from other countries, what happens?

The South, on the other hand, had a tremendous advantage when it came to leadership. They may not have been able to compete on the same level when it came to putting sheer numbers of men on the field of battle, but many of the Army's top officers prior to 1861 had Southern roots, and there was a marked reluctance on the part of those officers to take up arms against their home states. If you've got the leadership, the numbers become less important. Plus, they had the advantage of fighting on their home turf. That was important not just because they knew their surroundings, but also because it gave them an added sense of urgency.

Add British naval support and French infantry support to superior leadership and the 'home field advantage', and the South might well have won.

Long story short, the South would have welcomed assistance from Europe, provided it didn't infringe upon their ultimate sovereignty.

Josh

[GoldenEagle]

All this information is very interesting. Thank you for the knowledge.

[JPhillips]

The political ramifications of the Emancipation Proclamation are too often ignored when it comes to foriegn intervention. Lincoln brilliantly forced the slavery issue on the international community. Neither England or France would have joined the South if they were seen as de facto defenders of slavery.

Lincoln used a military draw that was a tactical victory to shut the door on intervention from Europe. Simply brilliant.

[SackAttack]

Mmh, yes, but it bears noting that the Emancipation Proclamation came at a point well after the boarding-at-sea of the British vessel. Never mind the fact that it came after Gettysburg, which was perhaps the single most important turning point of the war. The South lost the services of Stonewall Jackson when his own men shot him on the tail end of that battle, and Lee never really found a commander afterwards in whom he could put the same trust.

The bloodshed was horrendous, and Lee more or less lost his stomach for invasion at that point and retreated back across the Rappahannock. After that it was pretty much a matter of defensive trench warfare while Grant hunted him down and Sherman marched on Atlanta.

England and France had been waiting pretty much all along to see if the South looked as though they'd be the decisive winners before jumping in, and that was even with the sensitive issue of slavery on the front pages of the Northern presses. Had Lee triumphed at Gettysburg and pressed on towards Washington, the Emancipation Proclamation might have had more relevance from an international standpoint, as it might have then discouraged England and France from joining a fight they might otherwise have taken to the North.

At the same time, Southern exports were important to British industry. They may not have sent soldiers, but I have to think that they'd have found a way to support the South if a sure and certain victory loomed. What better way to negotiate sweetheart terms for cotton?

Josh

[Chief Rum]

Originally posted by SackAttack
Mmh, yes, but it bears noting that the Emancipation Proclamation came at a point well after the boarding-at-sea of the British vessel. Never mind the fact that it came after Gettysburg, which was perhaps the single most important turning point of the war. The South lost the services of Stonewall Jackson when his own men shot him on the tail end of that battle, and Lee never really found a commander afterwards in whom he could put the same trust.

I'm not really disputing your main point, but I wanted to point out that, unless I am completely misunderstanding your use of pronouns or context, you have some factual errors here.

The Emancipation Proclamation was declared by President Lincoln on September 22, 1862, almost ten months before the Battle of Gettysburg. It was officially signed into law as the 13th Amendment of the Constitution on January 1, 1863, almost exactly six months before Gettysburg.

Stonewall Jackson never reached the Battle of Gettysburg and had no effect on it whatsoever (other then by his absence). Jackson was shot by his own men, as you noted, but he was shot and died May 2, 1863, two months before Gettysburg, at the Battle of Chancellorsville.

Once again, I'm not disputing your basic premise about English and French potential involvement in our Civil War, but if you are basing that supposition in any way on your first paragraph, it would seem you have some facts wrong.

Chief Rum

[SackAttack]

The first one is probably just me mixing up my Lincolnian (is that even a word?) speeches. It wouldn't be the first time.

To the second error, all I can say is I've been sick for a week and I'm relying on my memory here. Never a good combination.

Thanks for catching those.

Josh

[Anrhydeddu]

Thanks Chief for the post. Antietam was truly the turning point of the war because that allowed Lincoln to make public the EP. Once that went into effect a few months later, there was no way England and France was going to declare for the Confederacy. That was the last true hope of winning the war without attrition and hoping for a peace settlement. You have to realize that the Spring of 1862 saw bad news for the Confederacy on every single front (esp. the loss of New Orleans, Nashville, Norfolk and much of the western waterways). They turned it around in the Summer but when they didn't get the support they expected in Maryland, combined with the retreat, what happened in Gettysburg at year later really was irrelevant in the grand scheme of things.

[Fritz]

Originally posted by SackAttack
I find it unlikely that France would have done much of anything, primarily because they never 'lost' land to the Americans in the first place. Florida, as I recall, changed hands from the French to the Spanish, who then ceded it to America following the Spanish-American War, and much of the land west of the Mississippi River was simply purchased from the French.

Wasn't the Spanish-American War in the 1890's, long after Florida had become a state?

[Anrhydeddu]

It must have been his medication. Lol.

1. The lands west of the Mississippi were ceeded to the French from the Spaniards.
2. That land was then purchased from the French by the US in 1803.
3. After the Mexican American war in 1846 (or thereabouts), much of the remaining land west of what was bought from the French were given to the US from the Mexican government through treaty.
4. Florida was ceeded to the US by Spain but I don't recall when.

[Fritz]

Originally posted by Anrhydeddu

4. Florida was ceeded to the US by Spain but I don't recall when.

Britain gained control of Florida in 1763 in exchange for Havana, Cuba, which the British had captured from Spain during the Seven Years’ War (1756–63).
Spain evacuated Florida after the exchange, leaving the province virtually empty. At that time, St. Augustine was still a garrison community with fewer than five hundred houses, and Pensacola also was a small military town.

When the British evacuated Florida, Spanish colonists as well as settlers from the newly formed United States came pouring in. Many of the new residents were lured by favorable Spanish terms for acquiring property, called land grants. Others who came were escaped slaves, trying to reach a place where their U.S. masters had no authority and effectively could not reach them. Instead of becoming more Spanish, the two Floridas increasingly became more "American." Finally, after several official and unofficial U.S. military expeditions into the territory, Spain formally ceded Florida to the United States in 1821, according to terms of the Adams-Onís Treaty.

Andrew Jackson returned to Florida in 1821 to establish a new territorial government on behalf of the United States. What the U.S. inherited was a wilderness sparsely dotted with settlements of native Indian people, African Americans, and Spaniards.

Florida became the twenty-seventh state in the United States on March 3, 1845. William D. Moseley was elected the new state’s first governor, and David Levy Yulee, one of Florida’s leading proponents for statehood, became a U.S. Senator. By 1850 the population had grown to 87,445, including about 39,000 African American slaves and 1,000 free blacks.

During the Civil War, Florida was not ravaged as several other southern states were. Indeed, no decisive battles were fought on Florida soil. While Union forces occupied many coastal towns and forts, the interior of the state remained in Confederate hands

http://www.theus50.com/florida/history.shtml

[Anrhydeddu]

bump (for WussGard and because ACW seems to be a hot topic for a few of us)

[WSUCougar]

The Gettysburg campaign is a fascinating one, for obvious reasons. But what’s often neglected in discussions of Lee at Gettysburg is that he did not intend to fight there. I think the Confederate “blunder” – and as the commander of the Army of Northern Virginia Lee is the culprit – was trying to imprint his strategy on a situation that didn’t warrant it.

Three of the goals for Lee’s invasion of Pennsylvania were to (a) feed the Confederate army off of the rich Pennsylvania farmland; (b) take the war onto Northern soil, thus damaging Union morale and increasing “war weariness” both politically and amongst the general populace in hopes of forcing a negotiated peace; (c) draw the Army of the Potomac out into the open, and then deal it a crushing, Napoleonic-style defeat.

Goal (a) went off as planned; as the rag-tag Confederates gorged themselves, and temporarily eased their already-pressing supply concerns back in Virginia. Goal (b) was well on its way to working, prior to the battle at Gettysburg. Pennsylvania was in chaos (I believe they were even throwing up barricades in Philadelphia, or something like that). But to complete that goal, they needed to attain goal (c). And therein lies the rub.

Lee was supremely confident in his army, and justifiably so. They were a potent fighting force, with a string of resounding victories behind them. The latest, Chancellorsville (fought in May 1863), was a masterpiece, but it cost the Confederates Stonewall Jackson. In a word, OUCH. I think Stonewall’s qualities as a general are debatable to some degree, but the issue was that Lee was comfortable with him, and he fit in perfectly with the command structure of the Army of Northern Virginia (ANV). Lee as an overall commander tended to offer a general plan for battle and then leave the details to his subordinates, up until this point that meant “wing” commanders Jackson and James Longstreet. Jackson was the ultra-aggressive, fast-mover to descend on the enemy flanks like a whirlwind; Longstreet the solid fist to knock them out. But with Jackson dead, Lee divides his army into three corps, adding corps commanders Richard Ewell and A.P. Hill to the mix with Longstreet. So now he’s got a different hand of cards to play.

Fast forward to July 1st at Gettysburg. Lee does not want a battle yet; he’s consolidating his scattered army so he can win that crushing victory. But the battle is brought on anyway, and portions of the ANV defeat portions of the Army of the Potomac. So far so good. But July 2nd is when it falls apart, and where I think Lee really blows it. He has a tentative Ewell on the Confederate left; A.P. Hill in the center (much of his troops worn out from the previous day), and 2/3 of Longstreet’s corps on the right. There is no one to available to “pull a Stonewall Jackson” – he instead asks his “solid fist” (Longstreet) to attack in an uncharacteristic fashion against an enemy in good defensive terrain. Longstreet demurs, and there is a lot of scholarly debate about his role in the battle, but eventually his attack fails after some hard-fought successes.

Day 3 brings Pickett’s Charge. The Army of the Potomac has all of its strength at hand, in addition to an excellent defensive position. To attack them is sheer folly, and anyone who argues that this was a close thing needs to study the Union deployment more.

I think that Lee lost sight of the reality of the situation at Gettysburg in hopes of inflicting that big, crushing blow. It just wasn’t going to happen.

[Anrhydeddu]

Coug, have you read Trudeau's Gettysburg (came out last year)? He apologized for adding to the tonnage of Gettysburg books but this one is highly praised for not only building upon all previous literature, but incorporating some of the new information and analysis that no one has done before.

[WSUCougar]

I have not. I'm so far behind in my reading that I may never recover...darn kid.

Have you read it?