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Dutch 08-06-2005 05:02 PM

OT: Hiroshima: The Right Thing To Do?
 
Did we do the right thing or not?

Buccaneer 08-06-2005 05:06 PM

In something that I read recently, I had not considered the savings of Japanese lives. We grew up hearing how that it had saved up to 2 million Allied lives but had not thought that it also had probably saved up to 5 million Japanese lives. As we have learned from the American Civil War, World War I and the European theatres of WW2, a war of attrition is awful.

TroyF 08-06-2005 05:10 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dutch
Did we do the right thing or not?



The single biggest decision a sitting president has ever made.

I was dismayed to learn from my 16 year old cousin that this topic was barely brushed over in history class. They learned about the bomb being dropped, but not any of the reasons behind it. I don't care if you think it was the right or wrong choice, I cannot believe we aren't teaching this generation about everything involved with it.

Dissapointing.

illinifan999 08-06-2005 05:15 PM

In our American History class we spent a day on WW2, and then moved on. The bomb got about 5 minutes.

jeff061 08-06-2005 05:15 PM

I get Monday off work for "Victory Day" because of it, so yeah.

More honestly, I'm not sure. It's a loaded question and people here can argue better than me(Troy's post might as well be about me ;)). There is the common explanation that we saved more lives dropping it rather than invading. But you also need to consider things not related to Japan, how it cemented our status in the world for decades.

Easy Mac 08-06-2005 05:26 PM

I'm kind of with jeff on this. Sure, we could have continued to firebomb Japan into oblivion, but I don't think it would have had near the effect on the world. I don't know if the Russians, or the rest of the world for that matter, would have feared or respected the US in nearly the same manner. Before, we were a large player in the world, but we weren't nearly the superpower we've been since. Who knows if it would have occurred. And I honestly couldn't say if the world is better off. I think it is, but its happened, and it worked.

Crapshoot 08-06-2005 05:27 PM

The nuclear age was introduced with that weapon - and an entire city was razed to the ground - civilians, and what not. Today we call warfare against civilians "terrorism". If war is meant to be fought by soldiers, than killing immense amounts of civilians is simply not justifiable. I understand the Allied soliders arguement, as well as the Japanese one - but it was a mass murder of the kind that is hard to "accept".

kcchief19 08-06-2005 05:28 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Buccaneer
In something that I read recently, I had not considered the savings of Japanese lives. We grew up hearing how that it had saved up to 2 million Allied lives but had not thought that it also had probably saved up to 5 million Japanese lives. As we have learned from the American Civil War, World War I and the European theatres of WW2, a war of attrition is awful.

The death estimates from an invasion of Japan are amazing in the way they change. The numbers you cite are much higher than anything I've ever seen.

Most documentation seems to suggest that estimates by the U.S. put American casualties at anywhere from 50,000 to 250,000, with predictably people against the bomb going with the lower number and those in favor with the higher number. Even Truman himself couldn't determine the correct number; there is a letter at the Truman Library he wrote where at one point he said 125,000 people would have died on both sides, then later in the same letter he says half a million lives total were saved.

The political underpinnings of the decision are fascinating. Did we drop the bomb to win the war or to show the Russians we had it and weren't afraid to use it?

I can't answer the question because I don't know the premise of the question. Was it "the right thing to do" morally? Strategically? What is the context? I think an intelligent person can be of two minds on the question.

I think the aftermath of the bombings is almost as intriguing as the decision to bomb. If we had mounted a conventional invasion of Japan, what would have happened?

kcchief19 08-06-2005 05:31 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by TroyF
I was dismayed to learn from my 16 year old cousin that this topic was barely brushed over in history class. They learned about the bomb being dropped, but not any of the reasons behind it. I don't care if you think it was the right or wrong choice, I cannot believe we aren't teaching this generation about everything involved with it.

Dissapointing.

Notably and I think admirably, the Truman Library's display on the decision has countless documents, videos and information about the bombings but at the end leaves it up to the visitor to make their own decision.

Crapshoot 08-06-2005 05:32 PM

Dola,
I'm genuinely curious how all of you that voted "yes" (and yes, many have posted that it was a hard decision) reconcile the fact that most deaths were civilian - and that you were targetting an entire city ( I recognize Hiroshima was a military target- still applies). If any kind of warfare is acceptable, then how can one complain about targetting civilians today ?

Easy Mac 08-06-2005 05:35 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Crapshoot
Dola,
I'm genuinely curious how all of you that voted "yes" (and yes, many have posted that it was a hard decision) reconcile the fact that most deaths were civilian - and that you were targetting an entire city ( I recognize Hiroshima was a military target- still applies). If any kind of warfare is acceptable, then how can one complain about targetting civilians today ?


Because we see the wars of today as completely different from WW2. Even Afghanistan is different, and I didn't mind going in there. In Iraq and Afghanistan, its generally the very small minority who wanted to fight, so therefore killing civilians today seems more barbaric. The stakes aren't nearly the same now as they were then, so to compare the to isn't entirely fair.

Buccaneer 08-06-2005 05:43 PM

Quote:

The nuclear age was introduced with that weapon

It didn't start with the dropping of the weapon for the research into the splitting of the atom (and the immense power it generated) had been going on for some years. If it hadn't been used in Japan, it would have been used somewhere, sometime - perhaps earlier under unique circumstances and most assuredly, later. But because it had been twice in 1945, one could argue that it couldn't be used again for a long time - and the Cold War bears testimony to that.

I didn't vote because I don't have an answer. I've studied warfare throughout the history of humankind and see this as an inevitable evolution.

Matt - I don't remember the source but it doesn't surprise me to see this become an urban legend of sorts.

wishbone 08-06-2005 06:11 PM

I've always kind of felt that the fact that the Japanese did not surrender immediately after the first bomb was dropped as justification for using it in the first place. The Japanese leadership were willing to continue the war after Hiroshima. Dropping another on Nagasaki 3 days later resulted in the unconditional surrender that America had been fighting for.

I don't think we should forget about the Dresden bombings either, those were just as indiscriminate and had a similar impact on the Germans living in that city.

Would it be right to drop another bomb? I don't think so. We have the ability to strike conventionally with more precision now and the nuclear weapons that we have now are far more powerful, they cause far more damage and prevent use of the land for much longer.

TroyF 08-06-2005 06:18 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Crapshoot
Dola,
I'm genuinely curious how all of you that voted "yes" (and yes, many have posted that it was a hard decision) reconcile the fact that most deaths were civilian - and that you were targetting an entire city ( I recognize Hiroshima was a military target- still applies). If any kind of warfare is acceptable, then how can one complain about targetting civilians today ?


It's very tough to reconsile that fact. Innocent civilians died because of that decision.

But lets look at a few factors here:

1) We know what would have happened had we continued the fight. The numbers might be in dispute, but there is no doubt there would have been many more people who died.

2) Lets not paint the Japanese as some group of people with higher moral values. During WWII, they launched thousands of "Fugos" These were balloons filled with bombs that were designed to drop and blow, killing anything in its path. Now, forget for a moment they were largely failures. Of the 9,000+ launched, only a few did any damage. The design was crystal clear. It was to kill US civilians.

Someone can correct me if I'm wrong, I think the final US death toll due to the fugo was only 5 or 6. A family in Oregon had found one. Not knowing what it was they tried to move it. It exploded and they all died.

May seem like only a minor point. . . but it does show the thought process of the Japanese and Truman had to pay attention to that.

3) WWII was not a war that you wanted to be a civilian in overall. Only the US civilian population came away unscathed. From Russia to London to France, civilians were randomly bombed during this war. (and we aren't even talking about the attempted extermination of the Jewish race yet)

I'm not trying to say this is right, but you must take into account what was happening around this war.


Like I said, for it or against it, this was one of the biggest ethical and moral issues any sitting leader has ever faced. Why it's not talked about more in schools is stunning to me.

SFL Cat 08-06-2005 06:20 PM

Yes, the cost of invading Japan in human lives would have been terrible (for both sides -- I've seen some figures in the 2-5 million range) and some historians doubt such an invasion's ultimate success.

After dropping the bombs, the Japanese quickly agreed to unconditional surrender. I have no doubt that if the Germans or Japanese had developed the technology before we did (the Germans were close), they would have used it.

Having actually used atomics, the whole world was able to see the devastating "real world" effects of such attacks. During the 20s and 30s, many sci-fi writers wrote flippant stories about future wars involving atomic weapons. I believe the horrific reality of using the bomb, including images of victims from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, is one of the major factors that have resulted in no further use of such weapons in warfare. I think most civilized states realize the cost of such an exchange is too high.

TroyF 08-06-2005 06:22 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by wishbone
I've always kind of felt that the fact that the Japanese did not surrender immediately after the first bomb was dropped as justification for using it in the first place. The Japanese leadership were willing to continue the war after Hiroshima. Dropping another on Nagasaki 3 days later resulted in the unconditional surrender that America had been fighting for.

I don't think we should forget about the Dresden bombings either, those were just as indiscriminate and had a similar impact on the Germans living in that city.

Would it be right to drop another bomb? I don't think so. We have the ability to strike conventionally with more precision now and the nuclear weapons that we have now are far more powerful, they cause far more damage and prevent use of the land for much longer.


There is actually some debate about this. Some historians believe Japan did in fact try to surrender after the first bomb and that the message was misinterpreted or ignored.

I'm not sure how much I believe it, but it's always made the debate about the second bomb just as interesting as the first.

CHEMICAL SOLDIER 08-06-2005 06:24 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by kcchief19
The death estimates from an invasion of Japan are amazing in the way they change. The numbers you cite are much higher than anything I've ever seen.

Most documentation seems to suggest that estimates by the U.S. put American casualties at anywhere from 50,000 to 250,000, with predictably people against the bomb going with the lower number and those in favor with the higher number. Even Truman himself couldn't determine the correct number; there is a letter at the Truman Library he wrote where at one point he said 125,000 people would have died on both sides, then later in the same letter he says half a million lives total were saved.

The political underpinnings of the decision are fascinating. Did we drop the bomb to win the war or to show the Russians we had it and weren't afraid to use it?

I can't answer the question because I don't know the premise of the question. Was it "the right thing to do" morally? Strategically? What is the context? I think an intelligent person can be of two minds on the question.

I think the aftermath of the bombings is almost as intriguing as the decision to bomb. If we had mounted a conventional invasion of Japan, what would have happened?

Didnt Operation Olympic (proposed inv. of Japan) involved up to 10 bombs to be dropped at Hyunshu just before the troops landed a shore.

Warhammer 08-06-2005 06:59 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CHEMICAL SOLDIER
Didnt Operation Olympic (proposed inv. of Japan) involved up to 10 bombs to be dropped at Hyunshu just before the troops landed a shore.


Not that I know of. We were actually in a bit of trouble. After both bombs were dropped, we were not going to have any additional fissionible material for some time.

There is no telling how many lives have been saved due to the atomic bomb. I once saw a chart floating around that showed how many people were killed worldwide due to wars, etc. The number was increasing pretty close to exponentially until 1945. Then the number dropped to virtually zero.

What happened to bring this about? What new weapon caused this change? The plane? No, that was around during WWI, and still was not a decisive weapon system. The submarine? No. Again, it was not a decisive arm. The single decisive weapon system was the atomic bomb. Since then, the fear of the bomb and retaliation by use of the bomb has prevented any truly global wars from erupting.

That is how I learned to stopp worrying and love the bomb.

Tigercat 08-06-2005 08:04 PM

It really depends on what kind of assumptions and thoughts you have on what would have been necessary to end the war with Japan in the first place. It is somewhat likely that more innocent japanese would have died if more firebombing would have been necessary. And what if we could only get Japan to a stalemate? Who knows how many would have died if a still militaristic Japan engages in a second war. Perhaps we should have dropped the two bombs, to prove we had more than one, but on areas with less population as a threat. But would such a threat have worked? I'm not sure.

Did we save more Japanese civilians by choosing the course of action that we did is the question. If its yes, which I would lean towards right now, then it was the right thing to do. I could care less if we saved American soldier lives by killing innocent civilians, I'd rather be a good human being before a good American.

korme 08-06-2005 08:54 PM

This is kind of a blowout.

vtbub 08-06-2005 09:16 PM

My feeling is that we would not be here today, if we had not dropped the bomb, it would have been used en mass later and life would have ended as we know it.

Dutch 08-06-2005 09:18 PM

A recent telephone Gallup poll suggests that only 57% of Americans approve while 38% disapprove of the use of the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima to end the war. I find that interesting considering we are a very diverse crowd here and have resigned ourselves (at a rate of over 90%) that we did the right thing.

RendeR 08-06-2005 09:28 PM

There is nothing resigned about it, I'd have dropped more if we had them. I don't believe in leaving an enemy alive to fight another day. But then again, I'm an asshole.

Tigercat 08-06-2005 10:00 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by RendeR
There is nothing resigned about it, I'd have dropped more if we had them. I don't believe in leaving an enemy alive to fight another day. But then again, I'm an asshole.


There are still plenty of Japanese civilians around today that were alive during WW2, grab a rifle and get over there to kill some "enemies!"

(Hopefully your post wasn't THAT serious. Civilians as enemies is what rationalized 9/11 for terrorists.)

jamesUMD 08-06-2005 10:11 PM

I think in a Gallup poll you might be getting people from younger generations and the numbers are going to come out skewed. I think that people that grew up during those years have much more valid worldviews of that time.

I think that our country citizen's have become way too insulated to the world and are somewhat oblivious. I think it's the easy way out to say we should not have dropped the bomb. It's ridiculous IMO, trying to use hindsight to determine if the correct decision was made. The world was a different place then, and to apply either current worldviews, or to try to guess the climate back then are impossibilities.

I saw somewhat of the same disconnect in South Korea when I was stationed there. The older generations that lived through the Korean War appreciated Americans being based in South Korea to help deter further aggression. The younger generation seemed to hate us, and viewed us as more of a foreign invader. Just my 2 cents.

For the record I am glad that most here on the board agree that we did the right thing.

Tigercat 08-06-2005 10:24 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by jamesUMD

I think that our country citizen's have become way too insulated to the world and are somewhat oblivious. I think it's the easy way out to say we should not have dropped the bomb. It's ridiculous IMO, trying to use hindsight to determine if the correct decision was made. The world was a different place then, and to apply either current worldviews, or to try to guess the climate back then are impossibilities.


Morality can improve, or perhaps I should say change, overtime. Do you think in the (comparitively) closed off world we lived in in the 40's people gave a shit about civilians of a nation with militaristic leaders? Today most would thumb their nose at making a hole where baghdad is, it just wouldn't be morally right to kill civillians like that.

I think the debate of IF the bombs should have been dropped is one that we must keep having, even if it was the right decision. The death of civilians is not something that should be taken lightly or a decision that should be forgotten. But we probably saved a good deal more civilian lives by dropping the bombs than not doing so, thats the important thing.

But if we look at the loss of any civilians as just necessities of winning our side of a war without consideration of alternatives, it makes us no better than the terrorists we are fighting today.

Galaxy 08-06-2005 10:43 PM

Do you guys think we'll see a nuclear war?

Warhammer 08-06-2005 10:50 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Galaxy
Do you guys think we'll see a nuclear war?


Unfortunately I think we will. While Western Culture has dominated the world, and the idea of each life having value, we were spared the horrific cost of a nuclear war. Unfortunately, as more cultures gain power that look at lives as just another pawn in their struggle for power, I think we will have a nuclear war.

jamesUMD 08-06-2005 11:12 PM

I agree that we do need to look at alternatives to the loss of civilian life whenever possible. If anything, though, I would say that Morality in this country has severly eroded, not improved since WW2.

I don't think it's an increase in moral values that has kept us from making a hole in Baghdad. It's globalization, intertwined economies, CNN, the United Nations, the internet, etc. etc.

Nations are much more dependent on each other than they were 50-75 years ago. Societies were also much more homogenous than they are today. In WW2 there was no USA Today, or universal mediums that we have now. Countries were, IMO to a certain extent more like what we see in North Korea today (or don't see lol). People got news through their government (or at the very least filtered). There were sovereign nations with nationalistic ideologies.

"Best information available at the time" is something I come back to. We were trying to draw up a treaty, were involved in a power struggle with Russia over control of Germany, we were racing with the Axis Powers (and Russia) to develop the Atomic bomb before they did, and continue the war against Japan. I just think if we feel we should debate whether or not we should have dropped the bombs, we need to understand the context of everything that was going on at that time.

ISiddiqui 08-06-2005 11:21 PM

Interesting question I thought of (but don't particularly have an answer). Why is it so much worse to kill civilians rather than conscripted soldiers? I mean those soldiers may not even want to kill Americans, they were just drafted by their countries to do so. I'm not advocating going after civilians first, but it's just a question I've puzzled over, especially in the context of WW2 when every country has conscripted militaries fighting. They weren't the ones necessarily who pushed for war or planned it.

Is it because the soldiers can defend themselves? From bombs they likely cannot... especially if their higher ups haven't given them any cover.

It's a sticky question in my mind. Why is it more moral to kill the guy wearing the uniform when the chances are he may just want to go home.

Tigercat 08-06-2005 11:34 PM

The water does get a bit murkier when soldiers are conscripted. You're not likely to be killing children when killing conscripted soldiers at least. From the US soldiers vs Japanese civilians standpoint there were at least a significant number of volunteers in the US army. And its not like those drafted were forced at gunpoint to go. Not a very practical arguement I know, but a civilian can't avoid a war if it comes to him/her, whereas the soldier, in the US's case, is bringing the war to civilians.

wishbone 08-07-2005 12:13 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by TroyF
There is actually some debate about this. Some historians believe Japan did in fact try to surrender after the first bomb and that the message was misinterpreted or ignored.

I'm not sure how much I believe it, but it's always made the debate about the second bomb just as interesting as the first.


I've read that the Japanese would have surrendered conditionally earlier in the year but that the Allies had already agreed on the only terms they would accept at Potsdam. It would seem kind of odd that the US leadership would ignore an offer of unconditional surrender but I'm sure that someone has made a case for it.

Sweed 08-07-2005 12:38 AM

Did we do the right thing? I think so. As others have said the world was different then. While you may not like it you have to look at it from the point of view of 60 years ago and not today. Now there's nothing wrong with looking back and trying to learn from the experience but when deciding right or wrong IMHO you have to use the context of the times.

IIRCC Warsaw, London, and other European cities were bombed long before Berlin. I also think it's safe to say that Japan bombed many civilians as they moved into China and other Asian countties. It was just a different time and the world has changed since then. If today's standards were the same as 1945 I don't think there would be a building standing in Baghdad.
I'm not saying that's the way it should be in todays world but in the world of 1945 I think it would be that way.

On a personal note this subject has probably had a direct effect on my life and maybe some others that are here also. My father would have been one of the soldiers in the invasion of the Japanese Islands and could very well be one of those American lives that was saved. .

He then became part of the occupation forces. He often talked of how well they were treated by the Japanese. Imagine that occupying a country and being able to remember it as a good time. Not as a time where you felt you had to be on constant watch for fear of being attacked. There were no guerrilla tactics or resistance to the occupying forces. The Japanese were told the war was over and that was it. It was a different world with different rules.

Looking back IMHO it more than likely saved many move lives than it took.
I think we should all thank God ( or whoever your are comfortable thanking )
that the US was the first to make the bomb. Imagine if anyone else besides
the US or Britian had done it. What would have happened if Germany, Japan, or even the Soviets under Stalin had done it first? Anyone want to hazzard a guess on how they would have been used?

Surtt 08-07-2005 12:49 AM

As shocking as the bomb was, it was no worse then the conventional tactics we were using. We had already killed over 100,000 people in one raid on Tokyo with fire bombs. Any moral questions were already answered when we decided to bomb civilians in the cities.

EagleFan 08-07-2005 01:35 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Crapshoot
Dola,
I'm genuinely curious how all of you that voted "yes" (and yes, many have posted that it was a hard decision) reconcile the fact that most deaths were civilian - and that you were targetting an entire city ( I recognize Hiroshima was a military target- still applies). If any kind of warfare is acceptable, then how can one complain about targetting civilians today ?


Are you serious? How can you complain about some individual group of people who have no actual affiliation with a country attacking civialians? Are you really serious about that question? Come one, get real.

Let's just assume for a second that you actually believe what you said.

On one hand you have a declared war between countries. A war which has already seen cities being bombed (meaning civilian casualties). Bombings which would have continued to happen as the war would drag on. Which means that the death tolls would not just have been soldiers but also civilians if the war had continued.

On the other hand you have a radical group of people who decide that the best way to get their so called message across is to kill civilians. That equates to murder and nothing to do with war.

Seems rather obvious.

EagleFan 08-07-2005 01:40 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Galaxy
Do you guys think we'll see a nuclear war?



Not in the true sense if the word war. I would like to think that most leaders understand that there will be no winner in a nuclear war. The only risk is that of a rogue group getting access to these kinds of weapons. Some radical terrorist group, those animals have no respect for life.

Chief Rum 08-07-2005 03:45 AM

I voted no, but only for one reason. There was no "right" thing to do. Sadly, our options were all wrong, but we had to pick one.

CraigSca 08-07-2005 06:46 AM

I'm not a military historian, but I do remember reading in the book "What If..." that the Russians actually planned an invasion of Japan in September of 1945 (and therefore actually hoped that the war continued). Dropping the bombs and the eventual surrender changed all that. However, it was interesting to read how different the world may have been had Russia invaded and had Japan as part of it's Iron Curtain.

Blackadar 08-07-2005 08:56 AM

Yes, without a doubt and anyone who thinks otherwise is a complete and utter moron.

Easy Mac 08-07-2005 08:58 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CraigSca
I'm not a military historian, but I do remember reading in the book "What If..." that the Russians actually planned an invasion of Japan in September of 1945 (and therefore actually hoped that the war continued). Dropping the bombs and the eventual surrender changed all that. However, it was interesting to read how different the world may have been had Russia invaded and had Japan as part of it's Iron Curtain.


Computers would have cost a lot more... and I think we wouldn't have had those hot anime babes.

Easy Mac 08-07-2005 09:00 AM

dola

I picked this up off another board... methinks he doesn't like america... Its truly Prawful writing.
hxxp://www.jang.com.pk/thenews/aug2005-daily/06-08-2005/oped/o6.htm

The world's worst terrorist act
Praful Bidwai
As the clock struck 8:15 a.m. in Japan this very day exactly 60 years ago, the world witnessed a wholly new kind and scale of brutality, leading to mass death. The entire city of Hiroshima was flattened by a single bomb, made with just 60 kg of uranium, and dropped from a B-29 United States Air Force warplane.

Within seconds, temperatures in the city centre soared to 4,0000C, more than 2,5000 higher than the melting point of iron. Savage firestorms raged through Hiroshima as buildings were reduced to rubble. Giant shock-waves releasing blast energy ripped through the city, wreaking more destruction.

Within seconds, 80,000 people were killed. Within hours, over 100,000 died, most of them crushed under the impact of blast-waves and falling buildings, or severely burnt by firestorms. Not just people, the body and soul of Hiroshima had died.

Then came waves of radiation, invisible and intangible, but nevertheless lethal. These took their toll slowly, painfully and cruelly. Those who didn't die within days from radiation sickness produced by exposure to high doses of gamma-rays or poisonous radio-nuclides, perished over years from cancers and leukaemias. The suffering was excruciating and prolonged. Often, the living envied the dead. Hiroshima's death toll climbed to 140,000.

This was a new kind of weapon, besides which even deadly chemical armaments like mustard gas pale into insignificance. You could defend yourself against conventional-explosive bombs by hiding in an air-raid shelter or sandbagging your home. To protect yourself from a chemical attack, you could wear a gas mask and a special plastic suit. But against the nuclear bombs, there could be no defence --military, civil or medical.

Nuclear weapons are unique for yet another reason. They are, typically, not meant to be used against soldiers, but are earmarked for use against unarmed non-combatant civilians. But it is illegitimate and illegal to attack non-combatant civilians. Attacking them is commonly called terrorism. Hence, Hiroshima remains the world's worst terrorist act.

Hiroshima's bombing was followed three days later by an atomic attack on Nagasaki, this time with a bomb using a different material, plutonium. The effects were equally devastating. More than 70,000 people perished in agonising ways.

US President Harry S. Truman was jubilant. Six days later, Japan surrendered. The US cynically exploited this coincidence. It claimed that the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had saved thousands of lives by bringing the war to an early end. This was a lie. Japan was preparing to surrender anyway and was only waiting to negotiate the details of the terms. That entire country has been reduced to a wasteland. Most of its soldiers had stopped fighting. Schoolgirls were being drafted to perform emergency services in Japanese cities.

American leaders knew this. Historians Peter Kuznick and Mark Selden have just disclosed in the British New Scientist magazine that three days before Hiroshima, Truman agreed Japan was "looking for peace". General Dwight Eisenhower said in a 1963 Newsweek interview that "the Japanese were ready to surrender and it wasn't necessary to hit them with that awful thing". Truman's chief of staff, Admiral William Leahy, also said that "the use of this barbarous weapon at Hiroshima and Nagasaki was of no material assistance in our war against Japan. The Japanese were already defeated and ready to surrender".

The real function of the two bombs was not military, but political. It was to establish the US's superiority and pre-eminence within the Alliance that defeated the Axis powers, and thus to shift the terms of the ensuing new power struggle in Washington's favour.

The Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings inaugurated another rivalry: the Cold War, which was to last for four decades. They also triggered fierce competition among the other victors of the World War to acquire nuclear weapons. The insane arms race this launched but hasn't ended yet.

From a few dozen bombs in the early 1950s, the world's nuclear arsenals swelled to several hundred warheads in a decade, and then several thousand by the 1970s. At the Cold War's peak, the world had amassed 70,000 nukes, with explosive power equivalent to one million Hiroshimas, enough to destroy Planet Earth 50 times over. One-and-a-half decades after the Cold War ended, the world still has 36,000 nuclear weapons. Nothing could be a greater disgrace!

Nuclear weapons are uniquely destructive and have never ceased to horrify people and hurt the public conscience. The damage they cause is hard to limit in space --thanks to the wind-transporting radioactivity over thousands of miles --or in time. Radioactive poisons persist and remain dangerous for years, some for tens of thousands of years. For instance, the half-life of plutonium-239, which India uses in its bombs, is 24,400 years. And the half-life of uranium-235, which Pakistan uses in its bombs, is 710 million years!

Nuclear weapons violate every rule of warfare and every convention governing the conduct of armed conflict, they target non-combatant civilians. They kill indiscriminately and massively. They cause death in cruel, inhumane and degrading ways. And the destruction gets transmitted to future generations through genetic defects. That's why nuclear weapons have been held to be incompatible with international law by the International Court of Justice.

The world public overwhelmingly wants nuclear weapons to be abolished. The pro-abolition sentiment is strong and endorsed by 70 to 90 percent of the population even in the nuclear weapons-states (NWSs), according to opinion polls. More than 180 nations have forsworn nuclear weapons by signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). But a handful of states remain addicted to their "nuclear fix". Led by the US, five NWSs refuse to honour their obligation under the NPT to disarm their nuclear weapons. And three of them, India, Pakistan and Israel, haven't even signed the treaty.

India and Pakistan occupy a special position within the group of NWSs. They are its most recent members. They are regional rivals too, with a half-century-long hot-cold war, which has made South Asia the world's "most dangerous place". There is an imperative need for India and Pakistan, rooted in self-preservation, to negotiate nuclear restraint and abolition of nuclear weapons. But the chances of this seem rather dim.

Even dimmer is the possibility of the five major NWSs embracing nuclear disarmament. Their reluctance to do so largely springs from their faith in nuclear deterrence. This is a dangerously flawed doctrine. It makes hopelessly unrealistic assumptions about unfailingly rational and perfect behaviour on the part of governments and military leaders and rules out strategic miscalculation as well as accidents. The real world is far messier, and full of follies, misperceptions and mishaps. Yet, the deterrence juggernaut rolls on.

Today, the system of restraint in the global nuclear order is on the verge of being weakened. The US-India nuclear deal (discussed here last week) is a bad precedent. But even worse are US plans to develop nukes both downwards (deep-earth penetrators or bunker-busters) and upwards ("Star Wars"-style space-based Ballistic Missile Defence). If the US conducts nuclear tests in pursuit of this, that will impel others to follow suit, and encourage some non-nuclear states to go overtly nuclear, raising the spectre of another Hiroshima.

Sixty years on, that would be a disgrace without parallel. Humankind surely deserves better.

TroyF 08-07-2005 09:05 AM

Nuclear war?

I'm almost certain of it.

As I've said in other threads, eventually terrorists will cross the line. I'm not as concerned about us as Israel, but that all changes if they start doing to us what they've done to Israel. (meaning a series of attacks that continue over a long amount of time)

If we don't do it, eventually some crazy bastard will. May not happen for 50 years. May not happen for 200 years. But I do believe it will happen.

Easy Mac 08-07-2005 09:06 AM

Ben Affleck nows... Sum of All Fears. Really not the assraping most people claim it is.

Dutch 08-07-2005 10:27 AM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Chief Rum
I voted no, but only for one reason. There was no "right" thing to do. Sadly, our options were all wrong, but we had to pick one.


A couple of people have picked up on the wording in that regard. My intentions were more along the lines of this.

August 1945
General: Mr President, the Atom Bomb is armed and ready. We can end this war in one mission or we can continue with the invasion plans. May I give the pilots of the Enola Gay clearance for takeoff?

President Truman: ...

Galaxy 08-07-2005 12:37 PM

Interesting...I always though if a terrorist group like Al-Quada (spelling?) would be smart enough to not use a nuclear weapon. I'll explain what I mean, why I think they wouldn't use one. Their intentions are get us out of the Middle East region. I would fear that by them using a nuclear weapon, they would have to expect us to use them in defense, and basically send them to the Middle East.

I don't think North Korea will use them. I feel they would have used them by now, and I believe that they are a "talker", but not a walker to get more aid, ect. If China-US go to war ever, I would be alittle scare. Pakistan and Iran and whoever they hate could be potential threats.

Tom E 08-07-2005 12:46 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Crapshoot
Dola,
I'm genuinely curious how all of you that voted "yes" (and yes, many have posted that it was a hard decision) reconcile the fact that most deaths were civilian - and that you were targetting an entire city ( I recognize Hiroshima was a military target- still applies). If any kind of warfare is acceptable, then how can one complain about targetting civilians today ?


Diffrent rules of war at the time...

I'm sure the Japs where carefull not to kill any civilians at pearl harbor...

Klinglerware 08-07-2005 01:01 PM

The issue of counter-force (strictly going after military targets) versus counter-value (targeting civilian targets, since they contribute to the power of a state) targeting is a long running debate and is full of ambiguity.

I would recommend reading Michael Walzer's "Just and Unjust Wars". It's a classic in military philospohy that lays out some of these ethical dillemnas (as well as the ethics of war in general).

Dutch 08-07-2005 01:08 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Galaxy
Interesting...I always though if a terrorist group like Al-Quada (spelling?) would be smart enough to not use a nuclear weapon. I'll explain what I mean, why I think they wouldn't use one. Their intentions are get us out of the Middle East region. I would fear that by them using a nuclear weapon, they would have to expect us to use them in defense, and basically send them to the Middle East.

I don't think North Korea will use them. I feel they would have used them by now, and I believe that they are a "talker", but not a walker to get more aid, ect. If China-US go to war ever, I would be alittle scare. Pakistan and Iran and whoever they hate could be potential threats.


The question should be whether the Al Qaeda want us out of the Middle East or do they want a massive war of Jihad. They will never fully segregate the Muslim and Western communities without it.

Galaxy 08-07-2005 01:09 PM

Good points Dutch.

CHEMICAL SOLDIER 08-07-2005 05:50 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Tom E
Diffrent rules of war at the time...

I'm sure the Japs where carefull not to kill any civilians at pearl harbor...

and Bataan,,,,,Corregidor,,,,Nangking....and the list goes on.

Dutch 08-07-2005 06:51 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by CHEMICAL SOLDIER
and Bataan,,,,,Corregidor,,,,Nangking....and the list goes on.


This reminds me that "The Great Raid" is coming out next week(?). Of course, that's about POW's and not civilians (so far as I know) but might be a good movie.

Easy Mac 08-07-2005 07:03 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dutch
This reminds me that "The Great Raid" is coming out next week(?). Of course, that's about POW's and not civilians (so far as I know) but might be a good movie.

I heard its been sitting on Miramax's shelf for over 2 years, but hopefully that isn't a testament to its quality.

cougarfreak 08-08-2005 10:50 AM

It became the right think to do on Dec. 7th, 1941. They picked a fight, and we finished it.

BrianD 08-08-2005 11:22 AM

It appears that most estimates have the number of civilian deaths in WWII are in the millions. Even if you take out atrocities like concentration camps, civilian deaths from bombing runs (generally carpet bombing done at that time) are in the millions. Civilian deaths were part of the war mentality back then, and is was a factor of the technology. Using today's morality to discuss the A-bombs doesn't really work. We would be looking at it in the wrong context.

Blackadar 08-08-2005 11:30 AM

So far...13 morons.

Pacersfan46 08-08-2005 01:16 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Blackadar
So far...13 morons.


Of course, different opinion always equals "moron" .....


:rolleyes:

bronconick 08-08-2005 02:22 PM

I think the Weekly Standard is considered to be "right wing" media, but this was a very interesting article they had that came out today.

hxxp://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/005/894mnyyl.asp?pg=2

Quote:

The sixtieth anniversary of Hiroshima seems to be shaping up as a subdued affair--though not for any lack of significance. A survey of news editors in 1999 ranked the dropping of the atomic bomb on August 6, 1945, first among the top one hundred stories of the twentieth century. And any thoughtful list of controversies in American history would place it near the top again. It was not always so. In 1945, an overwhelming majority of Americans regarded as a matter of course that the United States had used atomic bombs to end the Pacific war. They further believed that those bombs had actually ended the war and saved countless lives. This set of beliefs is now sometimes labeled by academic historians the "traditionalist" view. One unkindly dubbed it the "patriotic orthodoxy."

But in the 1960s, what were previously modest and scattered challenges of the decision to use the bombs began to crystallize into a rival canon. The challengers were branded "revisionists," but this is inapt. Any historian who gains possession of significant new evidence has a duty to revise his appreciation of the relevant events. These challengers are better termed critics.

The critics share three fundamental premises. The first is that Japan's situation in 1945 was catastrophically hopeless. The second is that Japan's leaders recognized that fact and were seeking to surrender in the summer of 1945. The third is that thanks to decoded Japanese diplomatic messages, American leaders knewthat Japan was about to surrender when they unleashed needless nuclear devastation. The critics divide over what prompted the decision to drop the bombs in spite of the impending surrender, with the most provocative arguments focusing on Washington's desire to intimidate the Kremlin. Among an important stratum of American society--and still more perhaps abroad--the critics' interpretation displaced the traditionalist view. These rival narratives clashed in a major battle over the exhibition of the Enola Gay, the airplane from which the bomb was dropped on Hiroshima, at the Smithsonian Institution in 1995. That confrontation froze many people's understanding of the competing views. Since then, however, a sheaf of new archival discoveries and publications has expanded our understanding of the events of August 1945. This new evidence requires serious revision of the terms of the debate. What is perhaps the most interesting feature of the new findings is that they make a case President Harry S. Truman deliberately chose not to make publicly in defense of his decision to use the bomb.

When scholars began to examine the archival records in the 1960s, some intuited quite correctly that the accounts of their decision-making that Truman and members of his administration had offered in 1945 were at least incomplete. And if Truman had refused to disclose fully his thinking, these scholars reasoned, it must be because the real basis for his choices would undermine or even delegitimize his decisions. It scarcely seemed plausible to such critics--or to almost anyone else--that there could be any legitimate reason that the U.S. government would have concealed at the time, and would continue to conceal, powerful evidence that supported and explained the president's decisions.


ut beginning in the 1970s, we have acquired an array of new evidence from Japan and the United States. By far the most important single body of this new evidence consists of secret radio intelligence material, and what it highlights is the painful dilemma faced by Truman and his administration. In explaining their decisions to the public, they deliberately forfeited their best evidence. They did so because under the stringent security restrictions guarding radio intercepts, recipients of this intelligence up to and including the president were barred from retaining copies of briefing documents, from making any public reference to them whatsoever at the time or in their memoirs, and from retaining any record of what they had seen or what they had concluded from it. With a handful of exceptions, they obeyed these rules, both during the war and thereafter.

Collectively, the missing information is known as The Ultra Secret of World War II (after the title of a breakthrough book by Frederick William Winterbotham published in 1974). Ultra was the name given to what became a vast and enormously efficient Allied radio intelligence organization, which secretly unveiled masses of information for senior policymakers. Careful listening posts snatched copies of millions of cryptograms from the air. Code breakers then extracted the true text. The extent of the effort is staggering. By the summer of 1945, Allied radio intelligence was breaking into a million messages a month from the Japanese Imperial Army alone, and many thousands from the Imperial Navy and Japanese diplomats.

All of

this effort and expertise would be squandered if the raw intercepts were not properly translated and analyzed and their disclosures distributed to those who needed to know. This is where Pearl Harbor played a role. In the aftermath of that disastrous surprise attack, Secretary of War Henry Stimson recognized that the fruits of radio intelligence were not being properly exploited. He set Alfred McCormack, a top-drawer lawyer with experience in handling complex cases, to the task of formulating a way to manage the distribution of information from Ultra. The system McCormack devised called for funneling all radio intelligence to a handful of extremely bright individuals who would evaluate the flood of messages, correlate them with all other sources, and then write daily summaries for policymakers.

By mid-1942, McCormack's scheme had evolved into a daily ritual that continued to the end of the war--and is in essence the system still in effect today. Every day, analysts prepared three mimeographed newsletters. Official couriers toting locked pouches delivered one copy of each summary to a tiny list of authorized recipients around the Washington area. (They also retrieved the previous day's distribution, which was then destroyed except for a file copy.) Two copies of each summary went to the White House, for the president and his chief of staff. Other copies went to a very select group of officers and civilian officials in the War and Navy Departments, the British Staff Mission, and the State Department. What is almost as interesting is the list of those not entitled to these top-level summaries: the vice president, any cabinet official outside the select few in the War, Navy, and State Departments, anyone in the Office of Strategic Services or the Federal Bureau of Investigation, or anyone in the Manhattan Project building the atomic bomb, from Major General Leslie Groves on down.

The three daily summaries were called the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, the "Magic" Far East Summary, and the European Summary. ("Magic" was a code word coined by the U.S. Army's chief signal officer, who called his code breakers "magicians" and their product "Magic." The term "Ultra" came from the British and has generally prevailed as the preferred term among historians, but in 1945 "Magic" remained the American designation for radio intelligence, particularly that concerning the Japanese.) The "Magic" Diplomatic Summary covered intercepts from foreign diplomats all over the world. The "Magic" Far East Summary presented information on Japan's military, naval, and air situation. The European Summary paralleled the Far East summary in coverage and need not detain us. Each summary read like a newsmagazine. There were headlines and brief articles usually containing extended quotations from intercepts and commentary. The commentary was critical: Since no recipient retained any back issues, it was up to the editors to explain how each day's developments fitted into the broader picture.

When a complete set of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary for the war years was first made public in 1978, the text contained a large number of redacted (literally whited out) passages. The critics reasonably asked whether the blanks concealed devastating revelations. Release of a nonredacted complete set in 1995 disclosed that the redacted areas had indeed contained a devastating revelation--but not about the use of the atomic bombs. Instead, the redacted areas concealed the embarrassing fact that Allied radio intelligence was reading the codes not just of the Axis powers, but also of some 30 other governments, including allies like France.

The diplomatic intercepts included, for example, those of neutral diplomats or attachés stationed in Japan. Critics highlighted a few nuggets from this trove in the 1978 releases, but with the complete release, we learned that there were only 3 or 4 messages suggesting the possibility of a compromise peace, while no fewer than 13 affirmed that Japan fully intended to fight to the bitter end. Another page in the critics' canon emphasized a squad of Japanese diplomats in Europe, from Sweden to the Vatican, who attempted to become peace entrepreneurs in their contacts with American officials. As the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary correctly made clear to American policymakers during the war, however, not a single one of these men (save one we will address shortly) possessed actual authority to act for the Japanese government.

An inner cabinet in Tokyo authorized Japan's only officially sanctioned diplomatic initiative. The Japanese dubbed this inner cabinet the Big Six because it comprised just six men: Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki, Foreign Minister Shigenori Togo, Army Minister Korechika Anami, Navy Minister Mitsumasa Yonai, and the chiefs of staff of the Imperial Army (General Yoshijiro Umezu) and Imperial Navy (Admiral Soemu Toyoda). In complete secrecy, the Big Six agreed on an approach to the Soviet Union in June 1945. This was not to ask the Soviets to deliver a "We surrender" note; rather, it aimed to enlist the Soviets as mediators to negotiate an end to the war satisfactory to the Big Six--in other words, a peace on terms satisfactory to the dominant militarists. Their minimal goal was not confined to guaranteed retention of the Imperial Institution; they also insisted on preservation of the old militaristic order in Japan, the one in which they ruled.

The conduit for this initiative was Japan's ambassador in Moscow, Naotake Sato. He communicated with Foreign Minister Togo--and, thanks to code breaking, with American policymakers. Ambassador Sato emerges in the intercepts as a devastating cross-examiner ruthlessly unmasking for history the feebleness of the whole enterprise. Sato immediately told Togo that the Soviets would never bestir themselves on behalf of Japan. The foreign minister could only insist that Sato follow his instructions. Sato demanded to know whether the government and the military supported the overture and what its legal basis was--after all, the official Japanese position, adopted in an Imperial Conference in June 1945 with the emperor's sanction, was a fight to the finish. The ambassador also demanded that Japan state concrete terms to end the war, otherwise the effort could not be taken seriously. Togo responded evasively that the "directing powers" and the government had authorized the effort--he did not and could not claim that the military in general supported it or that the fight-to-the-end policy had been replaced. Indeed, Togo added: "Please bear particularly in mind, however, that we are not seeking the Russians' mediation for anything like an unconditional surrender."

This last comment triggered a fateful exchange. Critics have pointed out correctly that both Under Secretary of State Joseph Grew (the former U.S. ambassador to Japan and the leading expert on that nation within the government) and Secretary of War Henry Stimson advised Truman that a guarantee that the Imperial Institution would not be eliminated could prove essential to obtaining Japan's surrender. The critics further have argued that if only the United States had made such a guarantee, Japan would have surrendered. But when Foreign Minister Togo informed Ambassador Sato that Japan was not looking for anything like unconditional surrender, Sato promptly wired back a cable that the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary made clear to American policymakers "advocate[s] unconditional surrender provided the Imperial House is preserved." Togo's reply, quoted in the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary of July 22, 1945, was adamant: American policymakers could read for themselves Togo's rejection of Sato's proposal--with not even a hint that a guarantee of the Imperial House would be a step in the right direction. Any rational person following this exchange would conclude that modifying the demand for unconditional surrender to include a promise to preserve the Imperial House would not secure Japan's surrender.

Togo's initial messages--indicating that the emperor himself endorsed the effort to secure Soviet mediation and was prepared to send his own special envoy--elicited immediate attention from the editors of the "Magic" Diplomatic Summary, as well as Under Secretary of State Grew. Because of Grew's documented advice to Truman on the importance of the Imperial Institution, critics feature him in the role of the sage counsel. What the intercept evidence discloses is that Grew reviewed the Japanese effort and concurred with the U.S. Army's chief of intelligence, Major General Clayton Bissell, that the effort most likely represented a ploy to play on American war weariness. They deemed the possibility that it manifested a serious effort by the emperor to end the war "remote." Lest there be any doubt about Grew's mindset, as late as August 7, the day after Hiroshima, Grew drafted a memorandum with an oblique reference to radio intelligence again affirming his view that Tokyo still was not close to peace.

Starting with the publication of excerpts from the diaries of James Forrestal in 1951, the contents of a few of the diplomatic intercepts were revealed, and for decades the critics focused on these. But the release of the complete (unredacted) "Magic" Far East Summary, supplementing the Diplomatic Summary, in the 1990s revealed that the diplomatic messages amounted to a mere trickle by comparison with the torrent of military intercepts. The intercepts of Japanese Imperial Army and Navy messages disclosed without exception that Japan's armed forces were determined to fight a final Armageddon battle in the homeland against an Allied invasion. The Japanese called this strategy Ketsu Go (Operation Decisive). It was founded on the premise that American morale was brittle and could be shattered by heavy losses in the initial invasion. American politicians would then gladly negotiate an end to the war far more generous than unconditional surrender. Ultra was even more alarming in what it revealed about Japanese knowledge of American military plans. Intercepts demonstrated that the Japanese had correctly anticipated precisely where U.S. forces intended to land on Southern Kyushu in November 1945 (Operation Olympic). American planning for the Kyushu assault reflected adherence to the military rule of thumb that the attacker should outnumber the defender at least three to one to assure success at a reasonable cost. American estimates projected that on the date of the landings, the Japanese would have only three of their six field divisions on all of Kyushu in the southern target area where nine American divisions would push ashore. The estimates allowed that the Japanese would possess just 2,500 to 3,000 planes total throughout Japan to face Olympic. American aerial strength would be over four times greater.

From mid-July onwards, Ultra intercepts exposed a huge military buildup on Kyushu. Japanese ground forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of four. Instead of 3 Japanese field divisions deployed in southern Kyushu to meet the 9 U.S. divisions, there were 10 Imperial Army divisions plus additional brigades. Japanese air forces exceeded prior estimates by a factor of two to four. Instead of 2,500 to 3,000 Japanese aircraft, estimates varied between about 6,000 and 10,000. One intelligence officer commented that the Japanese defenses threatened "to grow to [the] point where we attack on a ratio of one (1) to one (1) which is not the recipe for victory."

Concurrent with the publication of the radio intelligence material, additional papers of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been released in the last decade. From these, it is clear that there was no true consensus among the Joint Chiefs of Staff about an invasion of Japan. The Army, led by General George C. Marshall, believed that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was time. Thus, Marshall and the Army advocated an invasion of the Home Islands as the fastest way to end the war. But the long-held Navy view was that the critical factor in achieving American war aims was casualties. The Navy was convinced that an invasion would be far too costly to sustain the support of the American people, and hence believed that blockade and bombardment were the sound course.

The picture becomes even more complex than previously understood because it emerged that the Navy chose to postpone a final showdown over these two strategies. The commander in chief of the U.S. fleet, Admiral Ernest King, informed his colleagues on the Joint Chiefs of Staff in April 1945 that he did not agree that Japan should be invaded. He concurred only that the Joint Chiefs must issue an invasion order immediately to create that option for the fall. But King predicted that the Joint Chiefs would revisit the issue of whether an invasion was wise in August or September. Meanwhile, two months of horrendous fighting ashore on Okinawa under skies filled with kamikazes convinced the commander in chief of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Chester Nimitz, that he should withdraw his prior support for at least the invasion of Kyushu. Nimitz informed King of this change in his views in strict confidence.

In August, the Ultra revelations propelled the Army and Navy towards a showdown over the invasion. On August 7 (the day after Hiroshima, which no one expected to prompt a quick surrender), General Marshall reacted to weeks of gathering gloom in the Ultra evidence by asking General Douglas MacArthur, who was to command what promised to be the greatest invasion in history, whether invading Kyushu in November as planned still looked sensible. MacArthur replied, amazingly, that he did not believe the radio intelligence! He vehemently urged the invasion should go forward as planned. (This, incidentally, demolishes later claims that MacArthur thought the Japanese were about to surrender at the time of Hiroshima.) On August 9 (the day the second bomb was dropped, on Nagasaki), King gathered the two messages in the exchange between Marshall and MacArthur and sent them to Nimitz. King told Nimitz to provide his views on the viability of invading Kyushu, with a copy to MacArthur. Clearly, nothing that had transpired since May would have altered Nimitz's view that Olympic was unwise. Ultra now made the invasion appear foolhardy to everyone but MacArthur. But King had not placed a deadline on Nimitz's response, and the Japanese surrender on August 15 allowed Nimitz to avoid starting what was certain to be one of the most tumultuous interservice battles of the whole war.

What this evidence illuminates is that one central tenet of the traditionalist view is wrong--but with a twist. Even with the full ration of caution that any historian should apply anytime he ventures comments on paths history did not take, in this instance it is now clear that the long-held belief that Operation Olympic loomed as a certainty is mistaken. Truman's reluctant endorsement of the Olympic invasion at a meeting in June 1945 was based in key part on the fact that the Joint Chiefs had presented it as their unanimous recommendation. (King went along with Marshall at the meeting, presumably because he deemed it premature to wage a showdown fight. He did comment to Truman that, of course, any invasion authorized then could be canceled later.) With the Navy's withdrawal of support, the terrible casualties in Okinawa, and the appalling radio-intelligence picture of the Japanese buildup on Kyushu, Olympic was not going forward as planned and authorized--period. But this evidence also shows that the demise of Olympic came not because it was deemed unnecessary, but because it had become unthinkable. It is hard to imagine anyone who could have been president at the time (a spectrum that includes FDR, Henry Wallace, William O. Douglas, Harry Truman, and Thomas Dewey) failing to authorize use of the atomic bombs in this circumstance. Japanese historians uncovered another key element of the story. After Hiroshima (August 6), Soviet entry into the war against Japan (August 8), and Nagasaki (August 9), the emperor intervened to break a deadlock within the government and decide that Japan must surrender in the early hours of August 10. The Japanese Foreign Ministry dispatched a message to the United States that day stating that Japan would accept the Potsdam Declaration, "with the understanding that the said declaration does not comprise any demand which prejudices the prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler." This was not, as critics later asserted, merely a humble request that the emperor retain a modest figurehead role. As Japanese historians writing decades after the war emphasized, the demand that there be no compromise of the "prerogatives of His Majesty as a Sovereign Ruler" as a precondition for the surrender was a demand that the United States grant the emperor veto power over occupation reforms and continue the rule of the old order in Japan. Fortunately, Japan specialists in the State Department immediately realized the actual purpose of this language and briefed Secretary of State James Byrnes, who insisted properly that this maneuver must be defeated. The maneuver further underscores the fact that right to the very end, the Japanese pursued twin goals: not only the preservation of the imperial system, but also preservation of the old order in Japan that had launched a war of aggression that killed 17 million.

This brings us to another aspect of history that now very belatedly has entered the controversy. Several American historians led by Robert Newman have insisted vigorously that any assessment of the end of the Pacific war must include the horrifying consequences of each continued day of the war for the Asian populations trapped within Japan's conquests. Newman calculates that between a quarter million and 400,000 Asians, overwhelmingly noncombatants, were dying each month the war continued. Newman et al. challenge whether an assessment of Truman's decision can highlight only the deaths of noncombatant civilians in the aggressor nation while ignoring much larger death tolls among noncombatant civilians in the victim nations.

There are a good many more points that now extend our understanding beyond the debates of 1995. But it is clear that all three of the critics' central premises are wrong. The Japanese did not see their situation as catastrophically hopeless. They were not seeking to surrender, but pursuing a negotiated end to the war that preserved the old order in Japan, not just a figurehead emperor. Finally, thanks to radio intelligence, American leaders, far from knowing that peace was at hand, understood--as one analytical piece in the "Magic" Far East Summary stated in July 1945, after a review of both the military and diplomatic intercepts--that "until the Japanese leaders realize that an invasion can not be repelled, there is little likelihood that they will accept any peace terms satisfactory to the Allies." This cannot be improved upon as a succinct and accurate summary of the military and diplomatic realities of the summer of 1945.

The displacement of the so-called traditionalist view within important segments of American opinion took several decades to accomplish. It will take a similar span of time to displace the critical orthodoxy that arose in the 1960s and prevailed roughly through the 1980s, and replace it with a richer appreciation for the realities of 1945. But the clock is ticking.

Richard B. Frank, a historian of World War II, is the author of Downfall: The End of the Imperial Japanese Empire

Crapshoot 08-08-2005 02:28 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Dutch
A recent telephone Gallup poll suggests that only 57% of Americans approve while 38% disapprove of the use of the Atom Bomb on Hiroshima to end the war. I find that interesting considering we are a very diverse crowd here and have resigned ourselves (at a rate of over 90%) that we did the right thing.


Truthfully, are you really surprised? I think this place is fairly right of center, amongst the regulars, much like the OOTP OT tends to be left of center. More so, you're getting a very American perspective on this - even money says if you conducted this poll anywhere other than the US, the numbers would be skewed heavily against it.

Blackadar 08-08-2005 03:49 PM

Quote:

Originally Posted by Pacersfan46
Of course, different opinion always equals "moron" .....


:rolleyes:


Normally, no.

In this case, yes.

Because anyone who voted no either doesn't understand the situation or doesn't want to understand the situation. There was NO viable option to dropping the bomb. Once people understand the Russian mobilization to invade Japan/China, the political alliances at the time, the estimation of American and Japanese deaths of an invasion, the mindset of the Japanese Big 6, the civilian damage from conventional bombings, asian civilians dying under Japanese rule, the rate of plutonium production, war secrecy, etc., then they'll understand that there was no viable alternative.


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